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CORPORATE MISBEHAVIOR &




The emergence of the phenomenon today known as the
transnational or multinational corporation (MNC)1 has been matched
by the emergence of MNC accountability as a significant international
issue. With the rise of the MNC and the onslaught of globalization, a
legal vacuum was born whereby MNCs could create subsidiaries and
exploit legal technicalities to avoid accountability in either home or
host state countries. However, as the power of MNCs increase, the
conduct of their business activities reveals the wide variety of
violations committed in the name of profit, and the issue of
accountability has come to the fore.
In 2008 the International Commission of Jurists Expert Legal
Panel (ICJ Panel) published its three-volume report entitled Corporate
Complicity and Legal Accountability2 (Report). The Report was a
study of the circumstances in which MNCs could be held accountable
for gross human rights abuses and how to hold them accountable. At
the international level, the Report focuses entirely on the criminal
notion of "complicity" and thus questionably envisages international
* B.Arts/LL.B (University of New South Wales, Australia), Adv. LL.M in
Public International Law, cum laude (University of Leiden, The Netherlands). I
wish to thank Larissa van den Herik for invaluable guidance and suggestions.
I use the terms MNC, corporation, private or business sector
interchangeably in this article. The UN Draft Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations, art. 20, defines an MNC as "an economic entity
operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities operating
in two or more countries-whatever their legal form, whether in their home
country or country of activity, and whether taken individually or collectively."
U.N. ESCOR, Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, Organizational
Sess. UN Doc. E/1988/39/Add.1 (1988).
2 Int'l Comm'n of Jurists (ICJ), Corporate Complicity and Legal
Accountability, vols.1-3, 2008, available at http://icj.org/IMG/Volume_l.pdf,
http://icj.org/IMG/Volume_2.pdf, & http://icj.orgiIMG/Volume_3.pdf
[hereinafter ICJ Report].
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criminal law (ICL) as apt for addressing MNC misbehavior.3 In fact, a
fair amount of literature concerning MNC accountability under
international law discusses accountability through the lens of the
criminal law concept of complicity, "aiding and abetting," or both.4
In contrast to the Report and the academic trend to date, this
article questions whether ICL is the most apt mechanism for dealing
with MNC misconduct, in light of the fact that most breaches of
international law by MNCs do not actually lead to the commission of
international crimes (generally understood as genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes). Rather, the most common and flagrant
MNC violations relate to violations in independent fields of law, for
example, human rights, labor law, and environmental law. 5 The article
therefore analyzes whether each of the latter branches of law offers
independent mechanisms at the international level adequate to address
specific instances of MNC misconduct. To do so, the article first
examines which international obligations, if any, can be said to either
apply directly or indirectly to MNCs with respect to each field of law,
focusing on both soft and hard law obligations.
Accordingly, the article is divided into two parts. Part I
addresses three independent categories of law, human rights law, labor
law, and environmental law (sections 1 through 3). The first subsection
of each of these sections examines the pertinent substantive obligations
in each field-both hard and soft law in origin-while the second
subsection of each section discusses existing accountability
mechanisms, if any. The last section of Part I explores several
3 Vol.3 of the ICJ Report focuses on civil liability, which is a uniquely
domestic law phenomenon and therefore falls outside the scope of this paper.
4 See Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity
in Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 339 (2001);
Andrew Clapham, Extending International Criminal Law Beyond the
Individual to Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups, 6 J. INT'L. CRIM.
JUST. 899 (2008); Anita Ramasastry & Robert C. Thompson, Commerce, Crime
and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches
of International Law: A Survey of Sixteen Countries, FAFO-report 536 (2006),
http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf [hereinafter FAFO Report].
5 George Andreopoulos, Giuliana C. Andreopoulos & Alexandros
Panayides, On the Responsibility of MNCs: Some Reflections, 7 INT'L BUS. &
ECON. RES. J. 61, 63 (2008) available at http://www.cluteinstitute-
onlinejournals.com/PDFs/971.pdf. Other breaches of international law are
possible; for example, breaches of the principle of non-intervention in the
domestic affairs of a state and the right to self-determination. See Fleur E.
Johns, The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of
International Law and Legal Theory, 19 MELB. U. L. REv. 893, 904-08 (1994).
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independent soft law frameworks established by various international
organizations and agencies that target businesses and encompass duties
pertinent to the three legal fields under examination.
Part II analyzes why the ICJ Report focused on ICL as the sole
framework by which to assess MNC misconduct at the international
level. Part II thus examines the field of ICL and questions if this ICL
focus is justified. Beginning with an analysis of complicity, the article
shows that not all references to corporate complicity envisage liability
under ICL. A second section reviews the concept of ICL-related
complicity and demonstrates that the substantive scope of ICL is
constricted to a very well defined range of potential MNC misconduct,
thus limiting its viability as a general solution for all MNC violations.
The next section illustrates that ICL is nevertheless well structured to
accept the concept of MNC accountability when compared to other
fields of international law. Finally, the article compares human rights
law with the ICL framework to reveal how they overlap and can
provide parallel means of redress for certain criminal acts.
The article concludes that ICL is not the most apt legal tool for
addressing all MNC violations if only by reason of its limited subject
matter. Alternatively, specialized mechanisms exist under international
law that provide direct and indirect MNC accountability for a wider
range of international law violations than those criminalized by ICL.
This network of mechanisms may be the only answer to meeting the
potential variety of MNC misconduct, and it certainly illustrates the
complexity of the issue.
Ultimately, the limited scope of ICL's subject-matter does not
prejudice the potential of ICL as an accountability mechanism for
MNC misconduct given its individualized, as opposed to state-centric,
focus. Thanks to its focus on individual actors rather than states, ICL is
more accommodating to the notion of direct criminal liability for
MNCs than, for example, human rights law, which to date focuses
uniquely on state actors.
As a word of warning, this article does not discuss remedies that
exist in domestic jurisdictions, such as those under the United States'
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) and under the French Penal Code.
Thus, also outside the scope of this article is a discussion on the debate
surrounding the proper duties of a home state versus a host state;
voluntary codes of conduct adopted by corporations; and initiatives by
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non-governmental organizations (NGOs).6 Its focus is purely on the
adequacy of existing instruments and frameworks at the international
level and, occasionally, the regional level.
7
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MNCs
A. INTRODUCTION: DIRECT V. INDIRECT OBLIGATIONS
The last twenty years has brought about a shift towards
recognizing the responsibility of MNCs as actors on the international
field, alongside states. The conventional idea that only states, as the
traditional guardians of human rights, can be held accountable for
human rights violations has been under challenge for some time now.
While states retain their primary position, international bodies have
increasingly recognized that MNCs also shoulder certain
responsibilities even though development in this direction has been
patchwork.8 The argument that MNCs should bear responsibility for
violations derives from their sheer size and economic capacities. Since
the annual revenues of the wealthiest MNCs can often surpass the gross
domestic product of developing countries, 9 the argument postulates that
their power and authority necessarily entails duties, liabilities, and
responsibilities. Leaving aside academic debates as to whether MNCs
are or may be subjects of international law, the real question of interest
is how should MNCs be held responsible?
When states control MNCs or otherwise delegate elements of
governmental authority to MNCs, the issue of MNC accountability
becomes less controversial. In such situations, the MANC is arguably
6 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Human Rights Guidelines for
Companies (1998), available at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/business/
pubs/hrgc.shtml; Friends of the Earth International, Towards Binding
Corporate Accountability, available at http://www.foei.org/en/what-we-
do/corporate-power/global/towards.html.
7 For a comprehensive overview of extrajudicial mechanisms dealing with
human rights grievances caused by MNCs, see generally Caroline Rees,
Grievance Mechanisms for Business and Human Rights: Strengths, Weaknesses
and Gaps, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative (John F. Kennedy Sch. of
Gov't, Harv. U., Working paper No. 40, 2008).
8 Hum. Rts. Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, UN Doc.
A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Hum. Rts. Council Report].
9 Jonathan Clough, Not-So-Innocents Abroad. Corporate Criminal
Liability for Human Rights Abuses, 1I AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (2005).
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either a dejure or defacto organ of the state. This is most commonly
illustrated by the American practice of outsourcing prison-related tasks
to private companies. Here, the secondary rules of attribution of
conduct serve to hold the state responsible for abuses of prisoners'
rights.' o The real controversy over MNC accountability arises when
MNCs undertake purely commercial activities independently of any
governmental contract or authorization. In such circumstances, how
can MNCs be accountable under international law? Are they subject to
international law obligations independently of their relationship with
the host state?
A review of existing international law instruments demonstrates
that MNC obligations under international law primarily arise in two
ways: indirectly or directly." Indirect obligations arise as a direct
corollary of the primary obligations agreed to by state parties in
traditional hard law instruments, such as conventions and treaties.
Since state parties agree to protect or to refrain from engaging in
certain activities, they must also ensure that private actors within their
jurisdiction comply with those obligations. 12 Some international law
instruments expressly provide for such state responsibility. 3
Secondly, although traditional international law did not create
direct obligations for INCs, the number of international law
instruments that either specifically target or include MNCs as duty-
holders is growing. Although the notion of enforceable, direct hard law
10 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 Y.B. OF
THE INT'L L COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/56/49 (Vol. I) /Corr.4.
I See Carlos M. Vazquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations
under International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927 (2005).
12 See International Council On Human Rights Policy, Beyond
Voluntarism: Human Rights and the Developing International Legal
Obligations of Companies, (2002), available at
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/7/107_report-en.pdf [hereinafter ICHRP].
13 For example, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea obligates
state parties to ensure that activities "forming the common heritage of
mankind," whether carried out by state enterprises or natural or juridical
persons, comply with the convention; otherwise, damage caused by the failure
of the state party shall entail liability. United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea Art.139(1)-(2), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. See generally,
Philip Alston, Mara R. Bustelo & James Heenan, The EU and Human Rights
559 (Academy of European Law, Oxford U. Press, 1999) (interpreting the
"common heritage of mankind," under Art. 136 of the Convention on the Law
of the Sea, as "the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction").
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obligations is somewhat contentious in certain fields, 14 numerous
international soft law instruments are a potential source of corporate
responsibilities. Such instruments are generally categorized as soft law
because they are only quasi-legal instruments.15  While soft law
instruments are generally regarded as not legally binding, they are
nevertheless regarded as reflecting a certain consensus among the
relevant state parties concerned. Hence their soft law status does not
deprive them altogether of any legal standing. Rather, such soft law
provides a necessary element-state practice-which may in the future
serve as a catalyst for the emergence of new norms of customary
international law. 6 In the words of Special Representative of the
Secretary-General (SRSG) John Ruggie, "As [soft law arrangements]
strengthen their accountability mechanisms, they also begin to blur the
lines between the strictly voluntary and mandatory spheres for
participants. Once in, exiting can be costly.' 7 Hence, there is the
possibility that with time, soft law norms will mature into international
legal principles that define corporate responsibility.
1. HUMAN RIGHTS
a. Human Rights Obligations
Serious abuses of human rights by MNCs may frequently arise as
complicity' 8 in abuses by host governments and non-state armed
groups, usually in communities lacking adequate institutional
mechanisms for human rights protection.' 9  However, MNCs,
particularly those engaged in specific commercial activities such as
manufacturing (which depends on cheap labor), resource extraction
(usually in less developed countries), and infrastructure activities
(raising health and environmental issues), are also prone to committing
direct human rights violations. 20  The most common transgressions
include 21 violations of rights concerning non-discrimination;
22 life,23
"4 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 13.
15 For purposes of international law, "soft law" is defined as "[g]uidelines,
policy declarations, or codes of conduct that set standards of conduct but are
not legally binding." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1519 (9th ed. 2009).
ICHRP, supra note 12, at 73-74; PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 110-12 (2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
'7 Hum. Rts. Council Report, supra note 8, 61.
'8 See infra Part II.
19 Andreopoulos et al., supra note 5, at 63.
20 ICHRP, supra note 12; MUCHLINSKI, supra note 16, at 507.
21 Andreopoulos et al., supra note 5, at 63.
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liberty, and security of erson; 24 freedom of opinion and expression;
25
freedom of association; 26 favorable working conditions; 27 health;28 and
self-determination, 29 all of which have been codified in several seminal
UN instruments at the international level. While those instruments did
not specifically envisage creating binding obligations for MNCs,
several of those documents nevertheless provide a legal basis for doing
SO.
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is
often regarded as the starting point for human rights. Insofar as its
preamble states "that every individual and every organ of society...
shall strive ... to promote respect for these rights and freedoms," it has
been argued that the phrase "every organ of society" encompasses
MNCs and renders them responsible for promoting and securing the
human rights set forth in the UDHR.3 ° Moreover, it has been argued
that Article 30 can also be construed as a positive obligation on MNCs
not to interfere with the rights contained in the UDHR.3'
22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), art. 2
[hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR Supp (No.
16), at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Jan. 3, 1976), art.2. [hereinafter ICESCR].
23 UDHR, supra note 22, art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 6.
24 UDHR, supra note 22, art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 9.
25 UDHR, supra note 22, art. 19; ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 19.
26 UDHR supra note 22, art. 20; ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 22.
27 UDHR, supra note 22, art. 23; ICESCR, supra note 22, art. 7.
28 UDHR supra note 22, art. 25; ICESCR, supra note 22, art. 12.29 ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 22, art. 1.
30 UDHR, supra note 22 (emphasis added). See Alston, supra note 13, at
560; ICHRP supra note 12, at 58-59; Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration
at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L 17, 25
(1999); Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Multinational Corporations
and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J INT'L L 45, 77 (2002).31ICHRP, supra note 12, at 60. Art. 30 provides: "Nothing in this
Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any
right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of
any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein" (emphasis added). Id. See also
Dinah Shelton, Globalization and the Erosion of Sovereignty in Honor of
Professor Lichtenstein: Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25
B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 273, 284 (2002).
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While the legal status of the UDHR is highly contested,32 the fact
that the UDHR does not provide for any enforcement mechanism
against every organ of society does not detract from its value or the
existence of its substantive obligations. 33 Even if the UDHR is not in
itself legally binding, the preamble of every human rights treaty drawn
up under UN auspices has endorsed it, thereby binding all UN member
states that have ratified such treaties.34 Additionally, the affirmation of
the UDHR by 171 states at the 1993 UN World Conference on Human
Rights in Vienna renders it difficult for MNCs to argue that they fall
outside the scope of the UDHR's obligations. 35 Lastly, some of the
principles of the UDHR are arguably jus cogens norms or at the very
least customary international law.
36
Other specialized human rights treaties, such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), have
also established a comprehensive body of substantive international law
to protect the rights of the individual, including the right to paid labor
and sanitary working conditions. 37 While these instruments do not
directly impose obligations on MNCs, they nevertheless impose on
states the general obligation to ensure the enjoyment of the rights
therein and to prevent abuse of those rights by non-state actors. To this
end, the various monitoring bodies of the respective instruments have
interpreted a state's obligations widely to encompass overseeing MNC
conduct.
32 On one hand, some argue it is only a non-binding instrument with no
legal force whose only purpose is to set a benchmark against which the
behavior of States, and today inter alia, MNCs, can be measured. W. Mwangi
& H.P. Schmitz, "Global Compact, Little Impact?": Explaining Variation in
Corporate Attitudes Towards Global Norms, (paper presented at the 2007
Annual Convention 'Politics, Policy, and Responsible Scholarship' of the
International Studies Association (ISA), Chicago, February 28-March 4 2007);
see also ICHRP, supra note 13, at 12. In the other camp, it is argued that
despite its non-binding nature, the UDHR represents customary international
law insofar as it has been adopted by the UN General Assembly in a
Resolution.
33 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 59.34 Id. at 61.
3 5 Id.
36 See Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear,
51 A.F. L. REv. 1, 75 (2001) (positing how many provisions of the UDHR
reflect customary international law).
37 See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text. See also infra Part I.A.2.
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For example, the Human Rights Committee-established under
the ICCPR as its monitoring mechanism-has confirmed that the
ICCPR poses "positive obligations on states parties to ensure Covenant
rights," which requires states protect citizens "not just against
violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts
committed by private persons or entities. 38  Moreover, states can
breach ICCPR obligations if they permit or fail "to take appropriate
measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or
redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities."
39
Even the ICCPR's travaux prparatoire indicate that many states
envisaged that the instrument would protect human life against
"unwarranted actions by public authorities as well as by private
persons.
4 0
Similarly, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR) has stated, "While only States are parties to the
Covenant and ultimately accountable for compliance with it, all
members of society-[including] the private business sector-have
responsibilities in the realization of the right to adequate food.' '4" The
CESCR found a similar responsibility applied to MNCs with respect to
the right to health42 and the right to work.43 Concerning the latter, the
General Comments to the CESCR even say that a state's failure to
protect citizens against human rights infringements by corporations was
equivalent to a breach of their positive obligations to protect citizens'
Article 7 rights. 44 And because water is necessary for both adequate
living standards45 and attainable standards of physical and mental
health,46 the CESCR extends states' duties to preventing "third parties,"
38 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 31 [80]: The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, §8, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
39 Id. (emphasis added).
40 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 48 n.125 (emphasis added).
41 U.N. Comm. on Econ. Soc. & Political Rights [UNCESCR], General
Comment 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), §20, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) (emphasis added) [hereinafter General
Comment 12].
42 See UNCESCR, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health, §42, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000)
[hereinafter General Comment 14].
43 See UNCESCR, General Comment 18: The Right to Work, §52, U.N.
Doc. E/C. 1 2/GC/18 (Feb. 6, 2006) [hereinafter General Comment 18].
44 See Id. § 32.
45 See ICESCR, supra note 22, art. 11.
46 See ICESCR, supra note 22, art. 12.
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including corporations, from interfering with or "denying equal access
to adequate water; and polluting and inequitably extracting from water
resources." 47 Paradoxically, notwithstanding recognition of the role
that MNCs can play with respect to various ICESCR rights, the CESCR
has repeatedly reiterated the long-established view that such enterprises
are "not bound" by the ICESCR,48 which leads to doubts as to whether
the CESCR itself considers corporate obligations to be legal ones.49
In contrast to the three instruments discussed above, later UN
conventions, discussion of which follows, address the role of non-state
actors more directly. These later conventions pose indirect obligations
on states to control the conduct of MNCs, failing which a complainant
may seek to engage the state's international responsibility before the
pertinent human rights body. Additionally, the human rights bodies
overseeing the implementation of these conventions have also
increasingly advocated for the responsibility and participation of non-
state actors in furthering such instruments' goals.50 The 1965 UN
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) obliges states to "prohibit and bring to an end . .. racial
discrimination by any persons, group or organization."51  The
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has further
asserted that "[t]o the extent that private institutions influence the
exercise of rights or the availability of opportunities, the state party
must ensure that the result has neither the purpose nor the effect of
creating or perpetuating racial discrimination." 52 Further, the General
Assembly has issued two declarations proclaiming that, in addition to
states, "institution[s], group[s] and individual[s]" are prohibited from
47 UNCESCR, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11
and 12 of the Covenant), §23, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter General Comment 15].
48 See General Comment 12, supra note 41, §20; General Comment 14,
supra note 42, §42; General Comment 18, supra note 43, §52.
49 See Hum. Rts. Council Report, supra note 8, 40-41, at 13.
50 See ICHRP, supra note 12, at 47-49 (including, for example, the Comm.
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation 19; the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
General Recommendation 20; and the Human Rights Comm.).
51 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 2(1)(d), Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352, 354
[hereinafter CERD Convention] (emphasis added).
52 Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD], General
Recommendation 20: Non-discriminatory Implementation of Rights and
Freedoms (Art. 5), §5, U.N. Doc. A/51/18 (Mar. 15, 1996).
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discriminating, be it on grounds of race or religion. 53 Equally, the 1979
UN Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) requires states "[t]o take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or
enterprise.,54 The UN Committee that monitors implementation of the
treaty has stipulated that "[s]tates may . . . be responsible for private
acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights
or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing
compensation."
55
The Convention on the Rights of the Child56 (CROC) places
positive obligations on states to protect children, even in the private
sphere. While recognizing that parents or guardians have the primary
responsibility for children, states nevertheless are legally obligated to
regulate private institutions that care for children;57 to abolish
traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children; 58 and to
protect children from economic exploitation and hazardous work.5 9
Moreover, the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child
prostitution, and child pornography obligates state parties to hold even
individuals responsible for violating its prohibitions, be it by criminal,
civil or administrative means.60 The Committee on the Rights of the
Child has also advocated in its General Comments for extensive state
obligations vis-A-vis the private sector.6 1 States are "urged" to regulate
many private actors, including preventing marketing companies from
53 See U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, art. 2(1),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (Nov. 25, 1981); U.N. Declaration on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 1904 (XVIII), art. 2(1), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/18/1904 (Nov. 20, 1963).
54 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women art. 2(e), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33, 36 (emphasis
added).
55 Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
[CEDAW], General Recommendation 19: Violence against Women, §9, U.N.
Doc. A/47/38 (Jan. 30, 1992).
56 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3,
28 I.L.M. 1456 [hereinafter CROCI.
5' Id. at 1459, art. 3(3).
58 Id. at 1466, art. 24(3).
59 1d. at 1468-69, art. 32.
60 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263,
Annex II, arts. 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000).
61 Vuyelwa Kuuya, Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, A
Discussion Paper, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, § 1, at 5.
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promoting "unhealthy products and lifestyles" (e.g., alcohol and
tobacco) that harm the health and development of children,62 and
preventing agricultural and entertainment companies (television, film,
media and advertising) from involving children in harmful work.63
The most concrete obligations concerning MNCs involve those
imposed by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) treaties
relevant to workers' rights, including obligations regarding collective
bargaining, the right to join trade unions, 64 freedom from forced
labor,65 and unhealthy and unsafe working environments.66 Although
they directly regulate the employer-employee relationship, ILO treaties
nevertheless envision that states, as opposed to private employers and
public institutions, will ensure the enjoyment of various employee
rights.6 7
Moreover, declarations adopted by the heads of government at




and social development 70 implicitly accept that companies should
62 CROC, General Comment No. 4: Adolescent Health and Development
in the Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, §25, U.N. Doc.
CRC/GC/2003/4 (July 1, 2003).
63 CROC, General Comment No. 7: Implementing Child Rights in Early
Childhood, §36(e), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1 (Sept. 20, 2006).
64 Int'l Lab. Org. [ILO], Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining
Convention, Convention 98, June 8, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257.
65 ILO, Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, Convention 105, June 25,
1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291.
66 ILO, Occupational Safety and Health Convention, Convention 155,
June 3, 1981, 1331 U.N.T.S. 279.
67 See ICHRP, supra note 12, at 49; Kuuya, supra note 61, at 6.
68 See ICHRP, supra note 12, at 65 n.184; U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I), 31 I.L.M.
874 (June 13, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
69 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 65 n.185. Fourth World Conference on
Women, Sept. 4-15, 1995, The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,
UN Doc. A/CONF. 177/20 and A/CONF. 177/20/Add. 1 (Sept. 15, 1995). This
declaration specifically obliges the private sector, employers, and enterprises to
prevent violence against women and strengthen women's economic capacity.
Id. §§125-126, 177.
70 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 66 n.186. World Summit for Social
Development, Copenhagen, Den., Mar. 12, 1995, Copenhagen Declaration on
Social Development and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 166/9
(Mar. 12, 1995). Section 45 of this declaration obliges the private sector to
"ensure gender equality, equal opportunity and non-discrimination... with full
respect for applicable international instruments" while §12 "encourag[es]
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shoulder certain responsibilities alongside their governments. The
declarations went so far as to establish explicit business goals for
companies, thus clearly charging the private sector to take on certain
internationally agreed responsibilities. 71  Although the declarations
adopted by the respective conferences are not legally binding, they
were adopted by heads of states or ministers of the vast majority of
countries and therefore arguably represent a global consensus of states.
Additionally, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) 72  has also published Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises that address human rights (OECD
Guidelines).73 Although the OECD, with only 31 member states, is not
a truly international organization in the sense of the UN and its
specialized agencies, its member governments have promulgated a
series of agreements between themselves, as well as guidelines
specifically targeting multinational enterprises. 74 The most recently
revised OECD Guidelines of 2000 introduced as a "General Policy"
that "enterprises should ... [r]espect the human rights of those affected
by their activities consistent with the host government's international
obligations and commitments. 75  Despite this attempt to impose
international law obligations on MNCs, given the patchwork
ratification of human rights treaties, an assessment measured against
transnational and national corporations to operate in a framework of respect for
the environment ... with proper consideration for the social and cultural impact
of their activities." Id. §§ 12, 45.
71 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 65.
72 The OECD, with 31 member states, is an international organization with
an economic, social, and environmental focus. Its policies aim to promote and
increase sustainable economic growth and employment, maintain financial
stability, and promote sound economic expansion both within its member states
as well as in cooperation with non-member states.
71 See infra Part I.A.4.b.
74 E.g., Amanda Macdonald, Hilke Molenaar & Peter Pennartz, The
IRENE Report 2000: Controlling Corporate Wrongs: The Liability of
Multinational Corporations: Legal Possibilities, Initiatives, and Strategies for
Civil Society (Law, Social Justice, & Global Dev. 2000).
75 See OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, June 21, 1976, 15
I.L.M. 9, as amended by OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME(2000) 20 (2000)
[hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. See also Comm. on Int'l Investment and
Multinational Enterprises, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises:
Text, Commentary and Clarifications, OECD Doc.
DAFFE/IME/WPG(2000)15/FINAL, Oct. 31, 2001, Ch. II, 2, at 11, available
at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/LinkTo/NT00002F06/$FILE/
JTOO I15758.PDF [hereinafter ClIME Report].
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the host state's international obligations does not provide a satisfactory
level of uniform accountability.
Lastly, the former UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights (SCHR) was quite active in establishing
human rights standards for MNCs. In 2002 it prepared the Draft
Fundamental Human Rights Principles for Business Enterprises,
76
followed in 2003 by the adoption of the 2003 UN Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.77 Both instruments seek to
provide an independent framework imposing on MNCs the entire range
of human rights obligations insofar as such rights may be applicable.
The SCHR complemented the draft Norms with its 2006 "Draft UN
Guiding Principles on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty. '78 Article 5
of the Guiding Principles envisages that "States, as well as all the
organs of society at the local, national, regional and international level,
have an obligation to take effective action to eliminate extreme
poverty." 79  Under Article 6, states and, inter alia, national and
transnational enterprises "have a responsibility to take into account and
fully respect human rights ... Infringements of these rights by the
above-mentioned entities ... should be regarded as violations of human
rights and their perpetrators should be held responsible, with the
corresponding legal consequences. 80
The foregoing illustrates a strong trend towards subjecting MNCs
to human rights obligations. However, by virtue of the state-centric
nature of human rights,8' such obligations are usually only applicable
within the territory of a signatory state and thus MNC activities within
76 U.N. Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights
[SCHR], Draft Fundamental Human Rights Principles for Business
Enterprises, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/X/Add.1,E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/
WG.2/WP. 1/Add. 1 (Discussion Draft Nov. 2001).
77 SCHR, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) [hereinafter U.N. Draft Norms]. See
Section 4.C. for further discussion on the Draft Norms.
78 U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, SCHR, Resolution 2006/9: Implementation of
Existing Human Rights Norms and Standards in the Context of the Fight
against Extreme Poverty, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/2, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/Sub. 1/58/36 (Sept. 11, 2006).
79 Id., art. 5 (emphasis added).
'
0 Id., art. 6.
81 See infra Part II for further discussion.
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that state. With the exception of the OECD Guidelines, 82 there is little
requiring states to regulate the activities of their MNCs operating
abroad.83 Hence, such regulation generally falls entirely to host
countries (usually developing countries) that are parties to the relevant
UN conventions. Considering the inconsistent ratification of the core
human rights treaties by developing countries, it is evident that the
existing UN human rights instruments and supporting bodies only offer
limited protection. Despite this, there is an increasing trend towards
encouraging extraterritorial regulation provided it does not interfere
with the internal affairs of the other state.84
b. Accountability Mechanisms
Having reviewed the various frameworks, which arguably
provide a legal basis for MNC accountability, the question becomes:
how can the obligations of MNCs actively be enforced? A review of
human rights enforcement mechanisms shows that although (quasi-
judicial) treaty bodies and courts are increasingly aware of the threat
that MNCs pose to human rights and the lacuna concerning MNC
accountability, the state ultimately remains the principal actor-and
violator-in the international field.85 Since discussions to date on the
establishment of an international civil court with universal jurisdiction
over both natural and legal persons allegedly breaching international
human rights norms86 remain wishful, and the jurisdiction of existing
82 See infra Part I.A.4.b.
83 For a failed attempt, see Corporate Code of Conduct Act, 2000, (Austl.).
The Corporate Code of Conduct Act attempts to impose standards on the
conduct of Australian corporations which undertake business activities in other
countries, and for related purposes. Id. See also, U.N. High Comm'r for
Human Rights, Workshop on Attributing Corporate Responsibility for Human
Rights under International Law, Co-convened by N.Y.U. Ctr. for Human
Rights & Global Justice and Realizing Rights: The Ethical Globalization
Initiative, Nov. 17, 2006, at 3, available at http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Documents/Workshop-Corp-Responsibility-under-Intl-Law-
17-Nov-2006.pdf; Hum. Rts. Council Report, supra note 8, at 5-7, 13.
84 Special Representative of the Secretary General, Protect, Respect and
Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, 19, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/5 2008 (Apr. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issuesdoc/human rights/HumanRight
sWorkingGroup/29AprO8_7_Report of SRSG to HRC.pdf [hereinafter
SRSG Ruggie, Report].85 Kuuya, supra note 61, § 3.
86 See Mark Gibney, On the Need for an International Civil Court, 26
Fletcher F. of World Aff. 47 (2002); Int'l Legal Resources Centre, Corporate
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human rights bodies is limited to assessing alleged violations by states,
the only solution to ensuring that globalization and privatization of
state functions do not result in a legal human rights vacuum has been
for international courts and bodies to devise astute legal theories.
Several judicial decisions, discussed in the following sections, illustrate
the intricate relationship that exists between the state and its MNCs and
how courts have used positive obligations to broaden states' human
rights responsibilities to encompass actions taken in the private sphere.
i. UN Treaty Bodies
The UN has eight human rights treaty bodies, each created in
order to monitor implementation of its core international human rights
treaty, as discussed above. Each committee oversees the progressive
implementation of its founding instrument by its member states and
reviews the reports submitted by its member states pursuant to their
monitoring obligations. Only five of the committees, namely the
CCPR,87 CERD, CAT, CEDAW, and CRPD, can also receive petitions
from individuals about the conduct of member states. 88 Hence, where
MNC misconduct is arguably linked to state action, complaints to the
pertinent human rights body may provide an effective accountability
mechanism. Unfortunately, the possibility to complain to treaty bodies
is only available to those state parties who agree to submit to their
jurisdiction. 89 The bodies have the power to recommend that victims
receive compensation or other remedies, and in cases of urgency, they
may order provisional measures, thereby halting potentially harmful,
irreversible state action.
90
Liability for Human Rights Violations, submitted to the U.N. by Ethical Funds,
Inc. (2004), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization/
business/docs/ethical2.doc.
87 Otherwise known as the Human Rights Council (HRC), formerly the
Human Rights Committee.
88 See ICHRP, supra note 12, at 83-84. Only the Committee on the Rights
of the Child and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights do
not provide for an individual complaints mechanism.
89 For example, the complaint mechanism under the ICCPR is only open
to those state parties that have signed the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. As
of 2009, 113 of the 165 ICCPR state parties have signed this Protocol. U.N.
Treaty Collection, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited May 10, 2010).
96-ICHRP, supra note 12, at 84.
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In addition to the complaints mechanisms, the CAT and the
CEDAW have an investigative power lacking in other UN bodies. At
the request of any person or organization, including NGOs, or by their
own initiative, either committee may investigate, within their respective
fields of competence, alleged systematic violations by states.91 While
investigations admittedly only occur in severe cases, this investigative
mechanism could well prove worthwhile when states allegedly fail to
protect citizens, or in the case of CEDAW specifically women, against
systematic or grave violations of human rights by companies.
92
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has issued decisions
illustrating the fine relationship between private business activities,
citizens' rights, and state responsibility under the ICCPR. In Hopu v.
France93 the applicants, descendants of the owners of an ancestral
burial ground, filed a complaint concerning the construction of a new
luxury hotel development by a government-owned company in Tahiti
on the burial grounds. They claimed that the construction of the hotel
complex on the contested site, which represented an important place in
their history, culture, and life, would arbitrarily interfere with their
privacy and their family lives. 94 The HRC agreed with the applicants
and found that France, which was ultimately responsible for Tahiti,
violated the applicants' right to family and privacy under Articles 17
and 23 by failing to consider the importance of the burial grounds for
the applicants when it decided to lease the site for the future hotel
complex.
Similarly, the case of Ldnsman v. Finlanap 5 demonstrates how a
people's cultural rights peed to be balanced against state programs that
encourage development or allow economic activity by private
enterprises. Like in Hopu, the HRC had to determine whether private
business activities-here, quarrying stone-carried out by a private
company pursuant to a government contract-here, with Finland-
violated the applicants' right to enjoy their own culture under the
ICCPR.96 The applicants, reindeer breeders of Sami ethnic origin,
91 Id.92 Id. at 85.
93 Communication from France, Views of the Human Rights Committee
under art. 5, para. 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993 (June 4, 1993).94 1d. § 10.3.
95 Communication from Finland, Views of the Human Rights Committee
under art. 5, para. 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (June 11, 1993).961d. § 9.1.
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claimed the activities of quarrying and transporting the stone through
their reindeer herding territory would disturb their reindeer herding
activities and the complex system of reindeer fences formed by the
natural environment. 97 Contrary to Hopu, the HRC found that the
Finnish government had considered the applicants' rights prior to
granting the quarrying permit such that the quarrying of stone did not
breach the applicants' right to enjoy their own culture pursuant to
Article 27.98
ii. Regional Human Rights Decisions
Similarly, regional human right courts, the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and
the Inter-African Court of Human Rights, also rely on the doctrine of
positive obligations 99 to adjudicate complaints touching on private
sector disputes. 100 With an ever-increasing notion of what the state's
duty to protect entails, these courts have found states responsible for
the misconduct of private business actors, notwithstanding their lack of
jurisdiction over business entities.
In Europe, the ECHR has held states responsible for violations in
classic private disputes, just as it has in dealing with disputes involving
the privatization of government services. For example, in Young v.
United Kingdom, the applicants were dismissed by their employer
because of their refusal to join one of three trade unions pursuant to a
9 7 Id. § 2.5.
98Id. § 9.6.
99 In contrast to "negative obligations" which are obligations for a state to
refrain from statal interference, "positive obligations" require a state to be
active in securing the effective exercise of rights, i.e. it does not suffice for the
state to withhold from omission. A.I.L. Campbell, Positive Obligations under
the ECHR: Deprivation of Liberty by Private Actors, 10 THE EDINBURGH L. R.
399 (2006), at 399-400 available at http://www.euppublishing.com/doi/
pdfplus/10.3366/elr.2006.10.3.399.
10 See Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser.
C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988). Although it did not deal with private business, the
decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights was the first to espouse
the "due diligence test." The Court held that this test requires that a state must
have taken reasonable or serious steps to prevent or respond to an abuse by a
private actor, including investigating and providing a remedy such as
compensation. Hence, the test assesses the efforts and willingness of a state to
act. Id.
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closed shop agreement.' 01  Despite the UK's argument that the
applicants' dismissal arose from a purely private dispute, which
consequently did not engage its responsibility, the ECHR found the UK
responsible for merely having legislation in force allowing for
dismissal of the applicants.1
0 2
Further, the ECHR jurisprudence in Costello-Roberts v. United
Kingdom precludes the possibility that states can contract out of their
obligations under international law by privatization. In certain
circumstances, even after privatization, state responsibility remains
engaged.
10 3
The ECHR has similarly given a wide interpretation to the right
to privacy and home life enshrined in Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights 10 4 such that MNC misconduct resulting
in environmental pollution can amount to a Convention violation. For
example, in L6pez Ostra v. Spain, the ECHR found that the Spanish
government failed to actively protect the applicants from the
detrimental environmental effects of a waste treatment facility next to
their home, which adversely affected their private and family life. 1 5
Similarly, in Guerra v. Italy, the ECHR reiterated the state's positive
obligation to protect its citizens from environmental pollution. 0 6 The
applicants lived in the vicinity of a private agricultural company
responsible for the release of toxic fumes (including arsenic
compounds). The ECHR found Italy had violated the applicants' right
to private and family life both because they were not informed of the
risks they and their families might face if they continued to live next to
1ol See Young v. United Kingdom (No. 44), App. No. 7601/76, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
102 Id.§ 49 ("Although the proximate cause of the events giving rise to this
case was the 1975 agreement between British Rail and the railway unions, it
was the domestic law in force at the relevant time that made lawful the
treatment of which the applicants complained. The responsibility of the
respondent State for any resultant breach of the Convention is thus engaged on
this basis.").
103 Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, 427 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 27
(1993) (holding that "a State could not absolve itself from responsibility by
delegating its obligations to private bodies or individuals").
'04 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 1, 1998, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
1"5 See L6pez Ostra v. Spain, 16798/90 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 46 (1994).
106 Guerra v. Italy (No. 64), 1998-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 152-53, 164 (1998).
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the factory and because they were not informed how to proceed in the
event of an accident at the nearby factory.
10 7
In the case of Awas Tingni, the applicants brought a complaint to
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in an attempt to stop timber
harvesting in their ancestral rainforest. 108 As in the HRC cases, the
case turned on the potential grant by the government of a concession to
a private company.' 0 9  The Inter-American Court considered that
Nicaragua had violated Article 21 of the American Convention on
Human Rights, °' which provides for the right of the members of the
Mayagna Awas Tingni Community to the use and enjoyment of their
property."' The court decided Nicaragua failed to delimit the extent of
the territory belonging to the Community and "granted concessions to
[private] third parties to utilize the property and resources located in an
area which could correspond" to native lands belonging to the
Community. 1
2
Further, the decision of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights (an organ of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights) in Social and Economic Rights Action Centre v.
Nigeria (Ogoni) highlights the interrelation between state and business
responsibilities.' 13 Here, two NGOs filed a petition with the African
Commission on behalf of the Ogoni people complaining about a series
of human rights violations allegedly committed by Shell Petroleum
Development Corporation (SPDC) against the Ogoni people."
14
Relying on jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights and the ECHR, the African Commission stated that
'governments have a duty to protect their citizens by protecting them
107 Id. § 60.
108 See Awas Tingni Indigenuous Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, 153 (Aug. 31, 2001).
109 Id. 6.
10 American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force July, 18 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.VII.82
doc.6 rev.I at 25 (1992).
A 1was Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, 153.
112id.
113 Soc. & Econ. Rts. Action Ctr. v. Nigeria, Aft. C.H.P.R., Comm. No.
155/96, (2001), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/
155-96b.html (noting, inter alia, Shell allegedly provided private security forces
in Nigeria with the weapons which were used to suppress minority groups)
[hereinafter Ogoni].
114id.§§ 1-9.
2010] CORPORATE MISBEHAVIOR & INTERNATIONAL LAW: 187
ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES TO "COMPLICITY"?
from damaging acts that may be perpetrated by private parties"' 15 and
that this entails positive action on the part of governments. The
Commission found Nigeria breached its obligations under the African
Charter by failing to enforce its laws and by condoning and facilitating
the operations of Shell in Ogoniland. 116  Despite the apparently
progressive nature of this decision, it is noteworthy that Nigeria's state
oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company, was the majority
shareholder in SPDC."
7
The foregoing jurisprudence illustrates that human rights bodies
are attempting to stretch the nexus between the corporation and the
government in an attempt to engage state responsibility. In situations
where the state is a major shareholder in a private company (Ogoni) or
grants a license to a private company (Hopu, Ldnsman, and Awas
Tingni) to the detriment of citizens' rights, the nexus that engages states
responsibility is apparent. The nexus becomes more tenuous, however,
where the private action is completely unrelated and independent of
state action. Nevertheless, even in these circumstances, the ECHR has
proved willing to stretch a state's positive obligations to the extreme,
for example by engaging state responsibility even where the nexus with
state action is negligible (Young and Costello-Roberts).
2. LABOR LAW
a. Labor Law Obligations
Labor law violations are another of the most widespread genres
of MNC violations and usually involve exploitation of local labor
forces in foreign developing countries. Common violations include
inadequate payment of wages, use of child labor, and imposing
extremely long working hours without paying insurance and benefits. "
8
Although labor law violations may closely overlap with certain human
rights violations, 119 there are other independent legal frameworks of
relevance to this area warranting independent discussion.
15 Id. § 57.
"
6 1d. §§ 69-70.
1"7 id. § 1.
118 Andreopoulos et al., supra note 5, at 63.
119 That is, labor-related protections under the ICESCR, as discussed
above, supra notes 22, 27-29.
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A principle instrument is the 1977 Tripartite Declaration of
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy
120
(Tripartite Declaration) adopted by the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) in response to the need to regulate MNC conduct
and relations with host countries, mostly in the developing world. The
Tripartite Declaration targets, inter alia, MNCs and seeks to transpose
to MNCs the obligations that states hold under various ILO
Conventions.12 1 The Tripartite Declaration urges MNCs to obey its
detailed provisions on equality of opportunity, employment security,
wages, benefits and working conditions, health and safety, freedom of
association, and collective bargaining. 22 Accordingly, Paragraph 8
urges:
All the parties [i.e., governments, employers,
and multinational enterprises] should respect . . .
relevant international standards. They should respect
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
corresponding International Covenants adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations as well
as the.., principles [of the ILO].1
23
The 1977 OECD Guidelines buttress the Tripartite
Declaration.' 24  Section IV of the OECD Guidelines specifically
concerns "Employment and Industrial Relations." The obligations that
the OECD imposes on MNCs include maintaining the freedom of
association and the right to collective bargaining, contributing to the
effective abolition of child labor, eliminating all forms of forced or
compulsory labor, and respecting non-discrimination in employment.'
25
The OECD Guidelines exhort that "[e]nterprises should, within
the framework of applicable law, regulations and prevailing labour
relations and employment practices" respect the right to freedom of
association and collective bargaining. 26 If this were to be interpreted
as setting national law as the minimum standard that MNCs need to
120 ILO, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy, 17 I.L.M. 422, para. 6 (1978) (amended 2000,
2006) [hereinafter Tripartite Declaration].
121 Id. para. 1.
122 id.
123 Id. para. 8.
:24 Id. para. 7.
125 ClIME Report, supra note 75, at 18-20, Ch. IV, 1, 22-24.
126 ClIME Report, supra note 75, at 18 (emphasis added).
2010] CORPORATE MISBEHAVIOR & INTERNATIONAL LAW: 189
ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES TO "COMPLICITY"?
obey, the guidelines would be self-defeating considering that most
violations occur by MNCs operating in developing countries, i.e.,
where the local standards are already significantly more lax. However,
according to the commentary to the guidelines, the reference to
"applicable law" acknowledges that MNCs are subject to more
obligations than merely those of the domestic jurisdiction in which they
operate and which may include "supra-national levels of regulation of
employment and industrial relations matters."
' 127
At the regional level, another agreement that seeks to offer
protection to workers is the 1994 North American Agreement on
Labour Cooperation (NAALC), 128 concluded as an addition to the
North American Free Trade Agreement 129 (NAFTA) between Mexico,
Canada, and the United States. "The NAALC was the first
international labor agreement . . . linked to a trade agreement."'
130
Indeed, the World Trade Organization still has not managed to arrange
one. 131
The NAALC aims to enhance and enforce basic workers' rights.
It established a set of Objectives (Part 1), Obligations (Part 2), and
Labor Principles (Annex 1) that its three state parties are committed to
promote, but it does not create any direct obligations for MNCs
operating in the territory of its state parties. However, it does provide
for an individual complaints mechanism, which results in indirect MNC
accountability. 1
32
127 Id. 19, at 19.
128 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, art. 8, Sept. 13,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1993 [hereinafter NAALC].
129 North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), 32
I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. See infra Part I.A.3.
130 Secretariat of the Comm'n for Labor Cooperation, The NAALC,
http://www.naalc.org/index.cfm?page = 147 (last visited May 26, 2010).
131 Beyond declaring an "existing collaboration" between the WTO and
ILO Secretariats at the First WTO Ministerial Conference in 1996 in Singapore
and the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha in 2002, the debate
continues as to whether the WTO is the correct institution to impose labor
standards. See Understanding the WTO: Cross-cutting and New Issues, Labour
Standards: Consensus, Coherence and Controversy,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/beySe.htm (last visited
May 26, 2010).
132 See infra Part I.A.2.b. and Part I.A.3.b.
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b. Accountability Mechanisms
At the international level, no single body directly regulates
MNCs regarding labor rights violations. Even the ILO, which one
would expect to be well-suited to safeguard the rights it advocates, is
relatively toothless. 133  Notwithstanding its Tripartite Declaration
concerning MNCs, the ILO lacks direct enforcement powers vis-A-vis
MNCs.1 34 At best, the ILO's supervisory mechanisms, designed to
oversee the implementation and application of ILO conventions by its
member states, only make MNCs accountable indirectly. The ILO's
supervisory mechanism provides for a two-tiered grievance system.
135
The first level allows workers or employer groups to lodge
complaints-dubbed "representations"--about a member state's
compliance with a given convention it has ratified, 36 while the second
level provides for complaints by other governments, official ILO
delegates, or the ILO Governing Body itself.'37
Resolving workers' complaints is predominantly a political
process 38 whereby the ILO seeks the consent of the concerned state to
send a Direct Contacts Mission to engage in an informal "dialogue,"'
' 39
concluding with the publication of a report. In cases of special
concern, i.e., cases of "continued failure to implement," a Commission
of Inquiry may be appointed to investigate the allegations. 140 The
Commission reports its findings and may make recommendations
concerning how the member can make its laws and practices consistent
133 Brian Langille, What Is International Labour Law For?, INT'L INST.
LAB. STUD., Mar. 2005, at 14, available at http://www.oit.org/public/english/
bureau/inst/download/langille.pdf.
134 Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing
Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 184 (2002); Cristopher
M. Kern, Child Labor: The International Law and Corporate Impact, 27
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 177, 189-90 (2000). See also infra Part I.A.4.a.




136 ILO Constitution, arts. 24-25, May 10, 1944. See generally Kimberly
Ann Elliott, The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labour Standards, INST. FOR
INT'L ECON., No. 00-6, July 2000, 1, at 2.
137 ILO Constitution, arts. 26-34 (1944).
138 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 91.
13" Id. at 90; Elliott, supra note 136, at 4-5.
140 ILO Constitution, art. 26(3) (1944).
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with the relevant convention. 141 If the member persists in its non-
compliance, "the governing body may recommend... such action as it
may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance therewith" under
Article 33.142
Since the ILO's birth in 1919, only eleven Commissions of
Inquiry have been appointed, and Article 33 was employed for the first
time in 2000 when workers filed a complaint against Myanmar
concerning alleged forced labor practices.143  In that case, the
Commission of Inquiry found "widespread and systematic use" of
forced labor in Myanmar, and the ILO Governing Body recommended
sanctions against a member state for the first time in its history. 144 The
complaint against Myanmar subsequently gave rise to the infamous suit
Doe v. Unocal,145 in which the primary issue was Unocal's
accountability for alleged complicity in using forced labor provided by
the Myanmar government to prepare for the construction of a gas
pipeline. 1
46
In sum, the ILO, notwithstanding its provision of indirect
accountability for MNC misconduct, is somewhat toothless because
while it allows for the lodgment of complaints, it does not provide for
enforceable adjudicative decisions. The ILO can only bind the member
states that ratify the various ILO conventions, but even then it is not
equipped with an enforcement mechanism against recalcitrant states, let
alone MNCs. Consequently, the ILO mechanism depends upon the
"good will" of the concerned member state to take action in reply to the
Commission of Inquiry.
At the regional level, NAALC provided for the creation of the
Commission for Labor Cooperation, 147 which is exclusively devoted to
141 Id. art. 28.
142 Id. art. 33.
143 See ILO, Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed under Art. 26
of the Constitution of the ILO to Examine the Observance by Myanmar of the




145 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
146 See Rachel Chambers, The Unocal Settlement: Implications for the
Developing Law on Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 13 HuM.
RTS. BR. 14 (2005), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/
pdfs/09unocal.pdf. Although the case was eventually settled, it was the first
US case to hold that ATCA actions could apply to private corporations.
147NAALC, supra note 128; see infra Parts I.A.3.a-b.
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labor rights and labor-related matters. Notwithstanding its lack of
direct applicability to MNCs, it provides for both domestic and
international mechanisms to ensure the effective enforcement of
existing and future domestic labor standards and laws. 148 As will be
seen, the NAALC provides for three tiers of labor rights, with different
levels of enforceability.1
49
At the domestic level, the National Administrative Office (NAO)
is the heart of the mechanism for receiving complaints by individuals.
The NAO is established within each state party's labor ministry, 150 and
its purpose is, inter alia, "to receive and respond to" the public's
(individual's and NGO's) complaints concerning any state party's
alleged failure to enforce certain labor laws.15 1 Individuals and NGOs
are only permitted to lodge complaints with their local NAO
concerning alleged violations of Tier I rights, which include freedom
of association, the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively,
and the right to strike.152 Considering Tier 1 rights encompass three of
the ILO's four fundamental principles, it is surprising that NAALC
only provides for "consultation," i.e. where NAO's can consult with the
state or recommend the ministers of states to consult with each other. 1
53
Even if the main subject of an NAO complaint is a state party,
the corporate activities of a private actor are usually implicated. To
illustrate, a complaint against the alleged failure of Mexico to enforce
labor rights laws, specifically the freedom of association, minimum
employment standards, and occupational health and safety standards,
concerned the Matamoros Garment S.A. de C.V. factory in Mexico.
154
Hence, the mechanism provides a limited degree of indirect MNC
148 See Secretariat of the Comm'n for Labor Cooperation, The NAALC,
supra note 130.
149 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 94-95.
150 NAALC, supra note 128, art. 9, §1.
151 Secretariat of the Comm'n for Labor Cooperation, The Nat'l
Administrative Offices, http://www.naalc.org/index.cfm?page=153.
152 NAALC, supra note 128, art. 49 (stating that "labor laws" include:
freedom of association and protection of the right to organize; the right to
bargain collectively; and the right to strike).
153 See ICHRP, supra note 12, at 96.
154 See US National Administrative Office, Bureau of International Labor
Affairs, US Dep't of Labor, Public Report of Review of NAO Submission,
Aug. 3, 2004, No. 2003-01, available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/
reports/nao/pubrep2003-1.htm#2a. The NAO's report insipidly recommended
only ministerial consultations with the Government of Mexico pursuant to
art.22 of NAALC.
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accountability. Notably, however, the NAO process is neither judicial
nor adversarial. It cannot investigate at its own motion or, for example,
precipitate a subpoena of evidence. Its task is merely passive fact-
finding, and the process concludes with a report of the NAO's
findings.' 55 At a minimum the NAO will conduct consultations with
either the NAO office of the accused state party 156 or with that state's
ministers. 151
The second mechanism for enforcing existing and future
domestic labor standards and laws available under NAALC may be
characterized as international since only states, not workers, can lodge
complaints, this time concerning purported violations of Tier 2158 and
Tier 3159 rights. Concerning Tier 2 rights, states may request the
establishment of an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE), which
will only result in a Final Report with non-binding
recommendations. 160 It is only with respect to Tier 3 violations that
states may request the establishment of an arbitration panel with quasi-
judicial powers and the prospect of sanctions against the violating
state. 161
As of September 2007, thirty-four complaints have been made
under the NAALC's NAO mechanism. Disappointingly, none have
surpassed the first phase of ministerial-level consultations or led to
monetary sanctions.162 Notwithstanding the numerous criticisms that
can be leveled at the NAALC's complaints mechanism, 163 indirect
155 See US Dep't of Labor, Public Reports of Review,
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/public-reports-of-review.htm (last
visited June 1, 2010).
156 NAALC, supra note 128, art. 21.
157 Id. art. 22.
158 Id. art. 49 (listing the following as a part of "labor laws": prohibition of
forced labor; elimination of employment discrimination; right to equal pay for
men and women; compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses;
and protection of migrant workers).
159 Id. (listing the following as a part of "labor laws": labor protection for
children and young persons; employment standards for example, concerning
minimum wages, overtime pay, etc; and prevention of occupational injuries and
illnesses).
160 NAALC, supra note 128, arts. 23-26.
161 See ICHRP, supra note 12, at 97-98. See also Secretariat of the
Comm'n for Labor Cooperation, Evaluation Committees of Experts and
Arbitral Panels, http://www.naalc.org/naalc/ece.htm.
162 See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs,
http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/programs/nao/status.htm.
163 See ICHRP, supra note 12, at 96.
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regulation of MNC misconduct is better than no regulation at all.
Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that its reach is geographically limited to
its three member states.
3. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
a. Environmental Obligations
64
Environmental disasters like the incidents at Chernobyl and
Bhopal and the Exxon Valdez oil spill highlight that MNC
accountability is an issue of considerable importance to environmental
law. Recognizing this, there is significant environmental regulation of
MNCs at the national level that derives from Multilateral
Environmental Agreements (MEAs) concluded at the international
level. 165 In comparison, there is relatively little direct MNC regulation
at the international level. In recent years, noting that some of the most
concerning practices of MNCs operating in developing countries
involved serious environmental disorder, such as toxic waste
dumping' 66 and natural resource exploitation, 167 which also prejudiced
human rights, specifically the right to health, the right to life, and often
minority rights, the field of human rights law has increasingly
enveloped environmental issues. While numerous human rights courts
increasingly regard environmental issues as constituting an essential
component of fundamental human rights and have occasionally dealt
with them as such, 168 there nevertheless remain specialized
environmental instruments, of both hard and soft law, that deserve
independent discussion.
164 This section has been reproduced and expanded into a separate article;
therefore, for further discussion of corporate governance in International
Environmental Law, see Miriam Mafessanti, Responsibility for Environmental
Damage under International Law: Can MNCs Bear the Burden? . . . And
How?, 17 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. _ (forthcoming 2010).
65 See MUCHLINKSI, supra note 16, at 556-66.
166 See Sebastian Knauer, Thilo Thielke & Gerald Traufetter, Toxic-Waste
Ship "Probo Koala ": Profits for Europe, Industrial Slop for Africa, SPIEGAL,
Sept. 18, 2006, http://www.spiegel.de/intemationa/Spiege/
0,1518,437842,00.html; Nigeria Waste Imports from Italy (NIGERIA), Trade
and Environment Database, available at http://wwwl.american.edu/TED/
NIGERIA.HTM (discussing the 1987 case of toxic waste dumping in Koko,
Nigeria).
167 See, e.g., Ogoni, Afr. C.H.P.R., Comm. No. 155/96.
'
68 See supra Part I.A. I .b.ii.
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The most significant codifications of environmental
responsibilities at the international level targeting MNCs directly are
contained in two soft law codes: Agenda 21169 and the environmental
portion of the OECD Guidelines. 170 The UN Norms encompass similar
environmental obligations which target MNCs directly but go further
by also providing for accountability. 71  Agenda 21 (the Agenda) is a
program first adopted by 178 governments at the 1992 UN Conference
on Environment and Development (familiarly known as the Earth
Summit), in Rio de Janeiro. 172 Agenda 21 has been dubbed as "the
most influential repository of MNE responsibilities in the
environmental field."'173 Chapter 30 of the Agenda, "Strengthening the
Role of Business and Industry," recognizes these groups as "full
participants in the implementation and evaluation of activities related to
Agenda 21.' ' 4
First, the Agenda calls on businesses to use their technological
capabilities to "play a major role in reducing impacts on resource use
and the environment."' 175 In this spirit, businesses are expected to
generally contribute to "cleaner production," i.e., the more efficient use
of resources and production with less environmental impact and
damage, 176 and bear general obligations such as "establish[ing] world-
wide corporate policies on sustainable development, [and] arrang[ing]
for environmentally sound technologies to be available to affiliates...
in developing countries."'
177
Second, the Agenda advocates that "business and industry should
increase self-regulation, guided by appropriate codes, charters and
initiatives integrated into all elements of business planning and
decision-making"' 78 and should be encouraged "to report annually on
169 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 65 n.184 (citing Conference on Environment
and Development, June 13, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151.26 (June 13, 1992)).171 See infra Part I.A.4.
171 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., SCHR.,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, §4.C., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003). See infra Part I.A.4.c.for
discussion.
172 Rio Declaration, supra note 68.
173 MUCHLINSKI, supra note 16, at 567.
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their environmental records." 179 Moreover, with reference to hazardous
waste generation and disposal, businesses are encouraged to "introduce
policies and make commitments to adopt standards of operation ...
equivalent to or no less stringent than standards in the country of
origin,"' 80 thereby referring to obligations in existing conventions.
181
The General Assembly reaffirmed the content and progress of
Agenda 21 in 1997, five years after its adoption, and again in 2002 at
the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Earth Summit 2002)
in Johannesburg. 8 2 The revision of the OECD Guidelines in 2000 also
reflected the principles of Agenda 21 by the inclusion of a section
concerning the environmental performance of MNCs.' 8 3 In addition to
Agenda 21, Chapter V of the OECD Guidelines1 84 expressly affirms the
principles and objectives of the Aarhus Convention 185 and generally
advocates that businesses integrate the protection of the environment
into the conduct of their business activities by collecting material as to
the impact of their activities on the environment, regular monitoring,
maintenance of contingency plans, and the adoption of new
technologies and operating procedures.' 
86
Finally, the final substantive section of the UN Draft Norms
concern "[o]bligations with regard to environmental protection."'
' 87
According to the Norms, businesses are to respect "national and
179 Id. 7 30.10(a).
'
0 Id. 20.9.
181 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the
Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes
Within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, 30 l.L.M. 773 [hereinafter Bamako Convention];
African, Caribbean and Pacific States-European Economic Community, Final
Act, Minutes, and Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomd, Dec. 15, 1989, 29
I.L.M. 783 [hereinafter Lomd IV Convention].
182 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable
Development, § 1, available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/
WSSD POI PD/English/WSSDPlanImpl.pdf.
18-See-OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises, Paris, June 27, 2000, DAFFE/IME(2000)/20, at 15-16.
'84 See infra Part I.A.4.b.
185 See Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25,
1998, 38 I.L.M. 517 [hereinafter Aarhus Convention].
186 See ClIME Report, supra note 75, 7 30, ch. V $T 1-2, 56.
187 U.N. Draft Norms, supra note 77, at T 1. See section l.A.4.c. for
further discussion on the Draft Norms.
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international law" as well as the precautionary principle.' 88 They are
obliged to "pursue the wider goal of sustainable development," and,
according to the Commentary, MNCs "shall ensure that the burden of
negative environmental consequences shall not fall on vulnerable
racial, ethnic and socio-economic groups."' 189 Moreover, they are
obliged to undertake environmental impact assessments vis-A-vis their
commercial activities and, most significantly, to "be fully accountable
for any negative environmental consequences."' 190  In this spirit,
environmental assessments are to be made publicly available and
submitted to the pertinent international bodies.19'
Turning to hard law, as noted above, there is little direct
regulation of general MNC activities at the international level.1 92 On
balance, like with human rights, environmental regulation places a
heavy onus on state responsibility. The few obligations imposed
directly on MNCs for the most part arise under liability instruments and
are generally limited to obligations such as the maintenance of
compulsory insurance coverage for ship owners.
193
Other than liability-related obligations, only a few additional
hard-law instruments refer, and then only indirectly, to the role of
MNCs in furtherance of the treaty's objectives. For example, the
Preamble to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants 194 recognizes the key contribution of the private sector "to
achieving the reduction and/or elimination of emissions and discharges
188 The precautionary principle is one of the fundamental pillars of
environmental law. As defined in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, it
provides that "[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation." Rio Declaration,
supra note 68, Principle 15.
189 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Comm'n on Hum. Rts.
Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights,
14, cmt. (c), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003)
[hereinafter Commentary on the Norms].
190 U.N. Draft Norms, supra note 77, 14.
191 Commentary on the Norms, supra note 189, 14, cmt. (c) and (d).
192 MUCHLINKSI, supra note 16, at 566.
193 See infra Part I.A.3.b.
194 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, pmbl., July,
31, 2006, 2006 0. J. (L 209) 3, 3 [hereinafter Stockholm Convention].
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of persistent organic pollutants. ' 95 More significantly, the Kyoto
Protocol' 96 recognizes that "private and/or public entities" may
participate in the "clean development mechanism" established under
Article 12,197 the aim of which is to provide a standardized instrument
for emissions offsetting for state parties. The effect is therefore to
subject MNCs in a limited way to the state's international obligations.
The 1989 Basel Convention, 198 developed in response to the
demands from developing countries for the international community to
regulate the trade of hazardous wastes to less developed countries, also
criminalizes the illegal traffic of hazardous wastes by all persons,
natural or legal.' 99 At the international 200 and regional levels,20  further
agreements also restrict the trans-boundary movement of waste, notably
to Africa, and extend the prohibitions to MNCs.
Finally, NAFTA merits discussion. 202  As its name suggests,
NAFTA primarily concerns regional integration by the reduction of
trade obstacles. However, to assuage concerns that an increase in trade
would result in a commensurate fall in environmental protections in
those jurisdictions whose environmental regulations and laws were
slipshod,203 environmental protection and the strengthening and
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations were included in
195 Rupert F. Pollard, Environmental Law and International Business,
NATURAL WATERS, http://www.naturalwaters.org.ukfdocuments/Enviro
%20Paper.pdf (last visited June 1, 2010).
196 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 37 I.L.M. 22, U.N. Doc. FCCP/CP/1997/L.7/Add 1 (1998).
197 Id. art. 12(9).
198 U.N. Env. Programme Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Global
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 [hereinafter Basel
Convention]; 1999 Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage
resulting from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their
Disposal, not yet in force, http://www.basel.int/meetings/cop/cop5/docs/prot-
e.pdf.
199 Basel Convention, supra note 198, art. 4(3) (providing that such illegal
traffic is criminal); art. 9(5) (requiring states to outlaw it in national laws); art.
2(14) (defining "Persons" as any natural or legal person).
200 Lomd IV Convention, supra note 181, art. 39 (prescribing a full ban on
all exports of hazardous wastes from any destination to Africa).
01 Bamako Convention, supra note 181, art. 1(16), defining a "Person" as
any natural or legal person.
202 NAFTA, supra note 129.
203 Stephen P. Mumme, NAFTA and Environment, FOREIGN POLICY IN
Focus, Oct. 1, 1999, http://www.fpif.org/reports/nafta-and-environment.
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NAFTA's preamble as being amongst its goals. NAFTA is
complemented by the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC), 20 4 the purpose of which is to guarantee that the
liberalization of trade practices is compatible with the states' existing
obligations under international environmental law. In sum, the
NAAEC requires its parties to ensure domestic law assures a high level
of environmental protection thus ensuring that domestic standards will
not be lowered to attract investment.205 Although neither NAFTA nor
NAEEC create any direct obligations for MNCs operating in the
territory of its state parties, they do create complaints mechanisms that
provide for indirect MNC accountability.
20 6
b. Accountability Mechanisms
One of the cornerstones of environmental law is the "polluter
pays" principle. For that reason, despite the lack of direct regulation of
MNC activities generally at the international level, numerous
instruments provide for the civil liability of MNCs when they engage in
prohibited activities (even where there is no resultant damage, akin to
strict liability offenses), as well as for compensation where there is
resultant damage. 20 7 Those instruments generally require registered
owners of vessels to maintain compulsory insurance coverage and to
regulate certain categories of environmental damage. Three examples
follow.
204 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Can.-
Mex.-U.S., art.14, Sept. 8-14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480; See also U.N. Env.
Programme, Guidelines for Enhancing Compliance with Multilateral
Agreements, UNEP Res. 95/10 (Feb. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.unep.org/DEC/docs/UNEP.Guidelines.on.Compliance.MEA.pdf.
205 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Can.-
Mex.-U.S., art.3, Jan. 1, 1994, available at
http://www.naaec.gc.ca/eng/agreement/agreement-e.htm [hereinafter NAAEC].206 See infra Part I.A.3.b.
207 See MUCHLINKSI, supra note 16, at 571-72; D. Craig, Environmental
Law - Corporate Responsibilities and Commercial Transactions, in
ENVIRONMENTAL OUTLOOK: LAW AND POLICy 223, 224-25 (Boer, Fowler,
Gunningham eds., 1994); Alexandre Kiss & Dinah Shelton, Strict Liability In
International Environmental Law, in LAW OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE THOMAS A. MENSAH
1131-51, 1140 (Geo. Wash. U. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper No. 345) (T. M. Ndiaye & R. Wolfrum, eds. 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1010478&rec= 1 &srcabs =2
66365.
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A convention imposed strict civil liability for oil pollution on the
"owner of a ship ' 20 8 (most usually a corporation) as early as 1969.
Another convention established an international fund from which
compensation would be paid as a backup in case liability under the
former convention could not be established.20 9  In 1992, a Protocol
consolidated the two conventions and expanded the geographical scope
of the fund to include pollution damage caused in the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). 2 10 Three similar conventions provide for civil
liability of owners in cases of oil pollution arising from exploration of
the seabed,2 1 ' the carriage of noxious substances at sea,2 12 and pollution
created by bunker oil.2 13 Compensation claims for pollution damage
are brought directly against the ship's registered owner, insurer, or
other persons providing financial security for the owner's liability for
pollution damage.2 14
Further, individuals affected by the trans-boundary impact of
industrial accidents on international waterways, for example fishermen
or operators of downstream waterworks, have a legal right to adequate
and prompt compensation against companies under the 2003 Protocol
on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary
Waters. 2 1 The Protocol ties actions arising under both the Convention
208 Int'l Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Brussels,
Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 4, as replaced by the Protocol of Nov. 27,
1992.
209 Int'l Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage, Brussels, Dec. 18, 1971, as replaced
by the Protocol of Nov. 27, 1992 [hereinafter Fund Convention].210Oid.
211 Int'l Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting
from the Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources,
London, May 1, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1451.
212 Int'l Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea,
London, May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1406, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.I0/8/2
[hereinafter HNS Convention].
213 Int'l Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage,
London, Mar. 23, 2001, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.12/DC/1.
214 Int'l Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra
note 208, art. 3(l); Int'l Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
Resulting from the Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral
Resources, art. 3(1), supra note 211.
215 U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Eur., Protocol on Civil Liability and
Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial
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on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes 216 and the Convention on the TransboundaryEffects of Industrial Accidents 217 and provides for strict liability.
Finally, nuclear liability was regulated by a series of treaties even
before Chernobyl occurred 218 and is primarily embodied in two
instruments. The first, the 1960 (Paris) Convention on Third Party
Liability, 219 aimed to balance competing needs, namely providing
victims with compensation while protecting the nuclear industry from
ruinous claims.22° It is coupled with the 1963 Brussels Supplementary
Convention, which sought to extend liability limits. The second
instrument is the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage. 221 After 1986's Chernobyl disaster, the 1988 Joint
Protocol222 united the two Conventions, seeking to provide one
common civil nuclear liability regime. Under this common scheme,
operators of the nuclear installations are exclusively and absolutely
liable for nuclear accidents. Unfortunately, the conventions do not
apply to nuclear incidents arising in non-contracting states or to
damage suffered in the territory of non-contracting states.223
Accidents on Transboundary Waters, U.N. Doc. MP.WAT/2003/1, U.N. Doc.
CP.TEIA/2003/3 (May 21, 2003).216 U.N. Econ. Comm'n. for Eur., Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, 1936
U.N.T.S. 269, 31 I.L.M. 1312 [hereinafter Helsinki Convention].
217 Helsinki Convention, supra note 216, 31 I.L.M. at 1330.
218 See Julia A. Schwartz, International Nuclear Third Party Liability
Law: The Response to Chernobyl, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2006,
available at http://www.nea.fr/htnl/law/chernobyl/SCHWARTZ.pdf.
219 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy, July 29, 1960, 55 A.J.I.L. 1082, as amended by the Additional Protocol
of Jan. 28, 1964 and the Protocol of Nov. 16, 1982.
220 Kiss & Shelton, supra note 207, at 1141.
221 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21,
1963, 2 I.L.M. 727, entered into force in 1977.
222 International Atomic Energy Agency: Diplomatic Conference to Adopt
a Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage and to Adopt a Convention on Supplementary Funding, Sept. 12,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 1454.
223 See generally Kiss & Shelton, supra note 207, at 1141-42; Schwartz,
supra note 218, at 44-45; Ian Hore-Lacy, Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage,
Encyclopedia of Earth, Dec. 11, 2009, http://www.eoearth.org/article/
Civil-liability for nuclear_ damage. The liability regime was further revised to
increase the amount and availability of compensation for victims in the 1997
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage and the
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At the regional level, conventions concluded under the auspices
of the Council of Europe (COE) also impose the "polluter pays"
principle on legal persons. 224 Similarly, the 2004 EU Parliament and
Council Directive on environmental liability with regard to the
prevention and remediation of environmental damage225 also forces
industrial polluters to pay for environmental damage. Moreover, in
1998 the COE concluded its first convention introducing corporate
criminal liability for environmental law breaches. 226  Its preamble
recognizes that "imposing criminal or administrative sanctions on legal
persons can play an effective role in the prevention of environmental
violations., 227 Subsequently, in 2003, the Council of the European
Union adopted a "Framework Decision" requiring member states to
impose liability on legal entities for environmental offenses.228
Although the Framework Decision encourages criminal liability,
member states have the option of imposing criminal or civil fines and
other "effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions," such as
disqualification from certain industrial or commercial activities, or even
229judicial supervision and winding-up of the corporation.
The Aarhus Convention provides an alternative means of
redress.23° Insofar as the Convention obliges states to implement and
develop means of redress at the domestic level for both violations of its
procedural requirements and violations of any national environmental
laws,2 3 1 it is not strictly-speaking an international mechanism for
2004 Protocols to Amend the Paris Convention and the Brussels Supplementary
Convention. See Schwartz, supra note 218, at 49-57.
224 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities
Dangerous to the Environment, art. 2(6), opened for signature June 21, 1993,
Europ. T.S. No. 150 ("'Person' means any individual or partnership .... whether
corporate or not").
225 Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and Council Apr. 21,
2004, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56.
226 Convention on the Protection of Environment through Criminal Law,
art. 9, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1998, 1998 Europ. T.S. No. 172
[hereinafter Convention on the Protection of Environment]. Article 2 provides
that the Convention applies to the activities of persons, including corporations.
Id. Art.9 recommends that member states impose criminal liability on
corporations, although states can opt for imposing administrative sanctions. Id.
art. 2.
227 id.
228 Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA on the Protection of the
Environment through Criminal Law, Jan. 27, 2003, 2003 O.J. (L.29) 55.
229 Id. art. 7.
230 Aarhus Convention, supra note 185.
231 Id. art. 9.
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accountability. Nevertheless, the Convention prescribes that each state
party must ensure that "members of the public have access to
administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by
private persons and public authorities which contravene provisions of
its national law relating to the environment. '" 232  To that end, the
Convention also requires the availability of "adequate and effective
remedies" which are "fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively
expensive" 233 and calls on state parties to consider "the establishment
of appropriate assistance mechanisms to remove or reduce financial and
other barriers to access to justice. 234  While the idea behind the
Convention is to fill the accountability lacuna, its effectiveness
nevertheless depends on national implementation measures, which in
many instances have been found to be lacking.235 At the international
level, the Aarhus Convention is the first environmental treaty
establishing a Compliance Committee that allows for individual
complaints. However, complaints concern the failure of state parties to
comply with the Convention's requirements rather than directly
concerning MNC violations.
NAFTA also has relevance to MNC accountability insofar as
Chapter 11, Article 1114(2) concerns environmental measures. This
provision allows a state party that believes that another party has
relaxed its domestic health, safety, or environmental measures in order
to encourage investment to "request consultations with the other Party
and the two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such
encouragement., 236 Articles 2006 to 2017 provide for alternatives to
consultation when the parties cannot reach agreement. Although the
complaints mechanism ultimately concerns a reported state's failure to
comply with its legal obligations, the mechanism allows states to
indirectly contest corporate activities in that state, even before the
activities begin-for example, where a state party grants a government
license to a private company that may precipitate a breach of domestic
health, safety, or environmental laws. A weakness of this mechanism
is that the Article only provides state parties with standing to bring such
complaints, not individuals or NGOs. Another weakness is that even
232 Id. art. 9(3).
233 Id. art. 9(4).
234 Id. art. 9(5).
235 See JusticeandEnvironment.org, Implementation of the Aarhus Convention
in EU Member States, 2006, http://www.justiceandenvironment.org/wp-content/wp-
upload/JE2006Aarhuslegalanalysis.pdf.
236 NAFTA, supra note 129, art. 1114(2).
237 Id.
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when a state complains about the relaxation by another state of its legal
obligations, the matter merely proceeds to an arbitral panel that issues a
non-binding final report.
The NAEEC has also established the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (CEC) with a mandate to conduct ongoing
environmental assessment of NAFTA's impact on the environment and
to promote the effective enforcement of environmental law.238 Under
the NAEEC, there are two ways that a NAFTA state party can be the
subject of CEC scrutiny for an alleged failure to enforce its
environmental laws. The first is the "Citizen Submissions on
Enforcement Matters" (SEM) process provided for by Articles 14 and
15 of the NAEEC.23 9 Article 14 provides, "Any person or [NGO] may
make submissions to the Secretariat asserting a [NAEEC] Party's
failure to effectively enforce its environmental laws."2 40  While the
complaints mechanism allows complaints addressing state failure, it
indirectly concerns corporations. An active file under consideration by
the Secretariat, which concerns wetlands in Manzanillo, Mexico,
illustrates this mechanism.241 In the case, a Mexican organization
alleges that the Mexican government is failing to effectively enforce its
environmental laws with regard to the protection of the Laguna de
Cuyutldn, Manzanillo. 242 Specifically, the complaint alleges Mexican
authorities should not have granted favorable environmental impact
authorizations to two infrastructure projects, one filed by the Federal
Electricity Commission and another operated by a private actor, Z Gas
del Pacifico.243 Thus the SEM process indirectly subjects corporate
activity to international inspection.
244
238 Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, http://www.cec.org/ (follow "About
the CEC" hyperlink, then follow "the Council" hyperlink) (last visited June 1,
2010).239 NAAEC, supra note 205, art. 14-15.
141 Id. art. 14.
241 Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation Secretariat, Wetlands in Manzanillo
Article 14(1) Determination, SEM-09-002 (Oct. 9, 2009), available at:
www.cec.org/Storage/84/8024_09-2-DETN 14 1 en.pdf.
242 Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Humedales en Manzanillo
Submission, Feb. 2, 2009, 1-2, http://www.cec.org/Storage/83/7902 09-2-
SUB es.pdf.
43 Id. 2.3-2.4.
244 The NAAEC provides for state parties to call each other to task where
there is allegedly "a persistent pattern of failure by that other Party to
effectively enforce its environmental law." The scheme envisages consultation
and eventual arbitration with a final report which makes a finding as to a state's
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Like the NAALC's NAO mechanism, 245 the SEM process is
neither judicial nor adversarial,246 nor does it seek to provide
compensation or remedies for victims. 247  At best, the CEC may
prepare a factual record of the allegation in question, which the Council
may make publicly available.248 However, the CEC Secretariat cannot
make determinations or "rulings" in the record as to whether a party is
failing to effectively enforce its environmental law obligations. 249 The
CEC's lack of teeth nullifies the incentive for NGOs to file complaints
about poor governmental compliance with legal obligations. 2' °  A
revision of the system allowing the CEC to hold states accountable for
their compliance breaches would prove more effective and more akin to
the human rights bodies discussed above.
The second NAEEC mechanism occurs at the international level,
like with NAFTA, and can be utilized when a state engages in a
"persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental
law., 251  Apart from some lengthier procedural differences, 252 this
method mirrors the process provided for by NAFTA by allowing a
fellow state party to enter into consultations and failing a successful
outcome, by referring the complaint to an arbitral panel. As noted by
one review of the efficiency of this mechanism, "it was designed so that
it would seldom be used., 253 Apart from its burdensome procedures, it
suffers from the same weakness as its sister mechanism under NAFTA,
inaction and provides for the eventual implementation of an action plan to
remedy the defaulting states' breaches. NAAEC, supra note 205, arts. 22-36.
245 NAALC, supra note 128.
246 Comm'n for Envtl Cooperation, http://www.cec.org/ (follow "Citizen
Submissions on Enforcement Matters" hyperlink) (last visited June 1, 2010).
247 ICHRP Report, supra note 12, at 93.
248 Aarhus Convention, supra note 185, art.15.
249 For active files and completed fact records, see Comm'n for Envtl.
Cooperation, http://www.cec.org/ (follow "Citizen Submissions on
Enforcement Matters" hyperlink, then follow "Registry of Citizen
Submissions" hyperlink) (last visited June 1, 2010).
250 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Daniel C. Esty, Diana Orejas , Luis Rubio &
Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA and the Environment: Seven Years Later (2000),
available at Peterson Institute for Int'l Economics, http://www.piie.com/
publications/chaptersjpreview/322/iie2997.pdf [hereinafter Hufbauer, et al.].
251 NAAEC, supra note 205, art. 22.
252 For a detailed analysis of the procedural differences, see Hufbauer, et
al., supra note 250, at 20-21.253Id. at 18.
206 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 6.2
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS
namely that only states may request the establishment of an arbitration
panel.254
This review indicates that civil liability of MNCs is a more
commonly accepted concept under international environmental law.
Although the numerous liability conventions are marked by their own
particularities, namely with respect to territorial application or the
extent or amount of liability that may be imposed and the types of
damage that may be protected, it is laudable that such regimes exist.
On the other hand, compensation claims assure remedies for victims
but not necessarily MNC accountability because MNCs do not suffer
punishment. Liability conventions aside, international law does not
generally regulate MNC misconduct; thus, regulation predominantly
occurs at the domestic level. And as discussed, while human rights
enforcement mechanisms also offer a possibility for lodging complaints
for breaches of environmental law at the international level, they do not
create direct NINC accountability but rather state responsibility for
MNC misconduct.
4. SOFT LAW FRAMEWORKS & INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
This section looks particularly at the accountability mechanisms
of the ILO Tripartite Declaration and the OECD Guidelines and
introduces additional soft law frameworks such as the UN Draft Norms
and the UN Global Compact. It also discusses the policies of the
World Bank Group because the contribution of international financial
institutions to MNC accountability should not be overlooked.
a. ILO Tripartite Declaration
The Tripartite Declaration's (the Declaration) obvious weakness
is that adherence to it by MNCs is voluntary; 255 thus, it is not legally
binding. In fact, the Tripartite Declaration limits itself to encouraging
enterprises to establish an internal mechanism for the examination of
employee grievances, pursuant to a procedure outlined in
254 ICHRP Report, supra note 12, at 93-94.
255 See Tripartite Declaration Concerning Multinational Enterprises and
Social Policy, at 3, para.7, 83 ILO Official Bull., Series A, No. 3 (2000),
available at http://www.ilo.org/global/Themes/Employment Promotion/
MultinationalEnterprises/lang--en/docName--KDO0121/index.htm [hereinafter
Tripartite Declaration 2000].
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Recommendation No. 130. 2 16 The Tripartite Declaration provides only
limited opportunities for individual complaints.
Although the Declaration initially did not fully provide for any
follow-up procedures, the situation gradually changed beginning with
the establishment of the Committee on Multinational Enterprises in
1980, followed in 1993 by the establishment of the Subcommittee on
Multinational Enterprises. 257 The mandate of the Subcommittee is "to
conduct periodic surveys on the effect given to" the Tripartite
Declaration and "to consider requests for the interpretation of the
provisions" of the Tripartite Declaration. 258 Governments can lodge
requests for interpretation, as can workers or worker organizations, but
general citizen groups cannot. 259  The interpretation mechanism
arguably provides for some degree of MNC accountability because an
interpretation request must "aris[e] from an actual situation;" 260 thus, an
MNC's conduct can come under direct examination. However, even if
a request is admissible, the subsequent process is not judicial, does not
give rise to any judgment concerning the actions of a MNC, and does
not provide for any remedies for victims. 261 Therefore, even if a reply
to a request for interpretation is published, its utility is limited to
clarifying what is intended by the Declaration's standards.262
Moreover, since the process is lengthy, the utility is more likely limited
to future situations than the one at hand.263
256 Id. para. 58 (citing Recommendation (No.130) dealing with examining
grievances in an attempt to reach a settlement).
257 MUCHLNKSi, supra note 16, at 475.
258 ILO, Governing Body-Subcommittee on Multinational Enterprises,
http://www.ilo.org/empent/Informationresources/lang--en/WCMS_ 101252/
index.htm (follow "Employment Center" hyperlink; then follow "Departments"
hyperlink; then follow "EMP/ENTERPRISE" hyperlink) (last visited June 1,
2010).
259 Tripartite Declaration 2000, Procedure for the Examination of Disputes
Concerning the Application of the Tripartite Declaration of Principles
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy by Means of
Interpretation of Its Provisions, supra note 255, para. 5 (a)-(c), at 19-20.
260 See id. para. 1, at 19.
261 MUCHLINKS1, supra note 16, at 475; ICHRP Report, supra note 12, at
103.
262 Muci4-wKsi, supra note 16, at 475.
263 ICHRP Report, supra note 12, at 103.
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b. OECD Guidelines
In 1976 the OECD published its Declaration on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises and its four related
instruments that also sought to impose direct obligations on MNCs. In
sum, the OECD instruments advocated non-interference by an MNC
into the affairs of its host country (in light of the alleged involvement of
an American company in the overthrow of the Allende government in
Chile)264 and established guidelines concerning foreign investment.
2 65
The associated OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
(Guidelines), drafted in the same year 266 and most recently revised in
2000,267 are wide-ranging recommendations by governments addressed
to multinational enterprises pertaining to employment, industrial
relations, environmental considerations, information disclosure and
transparency (bribery), competition, taxation, and other aspects of
corporate activity.268  The Guidelines were intended to be
recommendations to OECD investors as to how to conduct their
operations in other OECD countries. 269 While portions of the OECD
Guidelines pertinent to each of the sub-sections of the current article
were discussed above, whether a sufficient enforcement mechanism
exists begs discussion.
For some critics, the Guidelines' principal weakness is that, like
the ILO Tripartite Declaration, observance of the Guidelines by
enterprises "is voluntary and not legally enforceable" by express
stipulation. 270  The commentary to the Guidelines declares them
"supplementary standards of behaviors of a non-legal character,
particularly concerning the international operations of these
264 See Jan Huner, The OECD Guidelines and the M41, in LIABILITY OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 197, 201 (Menno
T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds. Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000);
John M. Kline, TNC Codes and National Sovereignty: Deciding When TNCs
Should Engage in Political Activity, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, Vol. 14,
No. 3 (Dec. 2005), 31-32, available at http://www.unctad.org/
en/docs/iteiit20059a2_en.pdf.
265 OECD Guidelines, supra note 75.
266 id.
267 Id.
268 See Duncan McLaren, The OECD 's revised Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises: A step towards corporate accountability, June 2000,
Friends of the Earth: Past Briefings, http://www.foe.co.uk/
resource/briefings/oecd_.guidelinesmultinational.html.
269 Huner, supra note 264, at 198.
270 ClIME Report, supra note 75, at 8, 1.
2010] CORPORATE MISBEHAVIOR & INTERNATIONAL LAW: 209
ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES TO "COMPLICITY"?
enterprises." 271 Despite this attempt to clearly categorize the
Guidelines as policy and not law, the Guidelines were nevertheless
adopted by a high-level, inter-governmental ministerial body
representing the OECD's (then) twenty-nine member states. According
to SRSG Ruggie, "The OECD Guidelines are currently the most widely
applicable set of government-endorsed standards related to corporate
responsibility and human rights. 272  Moreover, the Guidelines
specifically focus on minimum standards for MNCs,273 in contrast to
the Tripartite Declaration, that targets states as well as MNCs.
Like the ILO Tripartite Declaration, the OECD Guidelines do not
provide for an effective enforcement mechanism but do provide a
mechanism for complaints (known as "specific instances").274 The
Guidelines provide mandatory implementation obligations for states as
well as for the establishment of National Contact Points (NCPs), which
constitute the Guidelines' enforcement mechanism.275 The NCPs, like
the NAALC's NAOs, are constituted by local government offices in
each of the OECD's 30 member states as well as its 11 non-member
states that nevertheless adhere to the Guidelines.27 6 The NCPs promote
the Guidelines and handle the complaints. 7  In contrast to the ILO
mechanism, the OECD complaint mechanism is open to all interested
parties in a case of violation, thus including victims, trade unions,
NGOs, and even political parties.278 Moreover, and again in contrast to
271 Id. at 9, 12.
272 Although Ruggie went on to note that "their current human rights
provisions not only lack specificity, but in key respects have fallen behind the
voluntary standards of many companies and business organizations [and that] a
revision of the Guidelines .. .would be timely." U.N. Hum. Rts. Council,
Promotion and Protection of All Human Right, Civil, Political, Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right To Development, 46, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/8/5 2008 (Apr. 7, 2008) (prepared by John Ruggie).273 ClIME Report, supra note 75, Preface, ch. I, 1, at 6, 8.
274 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2008, at 34,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (last visited June 1, 2010).275 CIIME Report, supra note 75, at 43, Ch. 1I; ICHRP, supra note 12, at
67; Huner, supra note 264, at 200-05.276 To date, the eleven non-OECD states include Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Egypt, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Peru, Romania, and Slovenia. See
Business and Society Exploring Solutions, OECD Nat'l Contact Points,
http://baseswiki.org/en/OECD -National-Contact- Points (last visited June 1,
2010) [hereinafter OECD Nat'l Contact Points].
277 Id.278 Id.
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the ILO mechanism, OECD complaints target the MNC entity279 and
not states.
Generally speaking, a complaint should be lodged with the NCP
in the state of the violation. However, in the event violations occur in a
non-OECD state (which is likely given that OECD states are dominated
by developed countries), complaints may be lodged in the home state of
the INC.280 This flexibility therefore allows complaints to be lodged
against both MNCs originating from an OECD country, as well as its
related entities, which may operate in non-OECD territories.
281
Furthermore, this flexibility has meant that violations occurring as a
result of MNC operations in Ecuador and Belize, India, the Philippines,
and Ghana (all non-OECD countries), were able to be lodged with the
NCPs in the MNCs' home states of Denmark, Netherlands, Norway,
and Sweden, respectively.
28 2
The purpose of each NCP is "to offer its good office[] to help the
parties resolve the issue ... by facilitating access to consensual, non-
adversarial means of resolution, such as conciliation or mediation.,
283
Thus possible outcomes include the parties agreeing to remediation or
284
compensation. Conversely, if no agreement is reached following
these efforts, the NCP issues a statement of whether a breach of the
Guidelines has occurred, and it may make recommendations
concerning how a company can improve its compliance with the OECD
285Guidelines. Although, strictly speaking, there is no "right of
appeal," the OECD's Committee on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises (CIIME), may review the recommendation or
interpretation of an NCP.286 An NCP may also seek guidance from
ClIME if it has doubts about the interpretation of the Guidelines.
287




282 See OECD, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: ENHANCING THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST CORRUPTION 18-20 (2003).
283 OECD Nat'l Contact Points, supra note 276.
284 id.
285 Id.
286 Id.; ICHRP, supra note 12, at 100.
287 OECD Nat'l Contact Points, supra note 276.
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Guidelines could damage a company's reputation, so they provide for
the possibility of keeping complaints confidential.288
When the Guidelines were first adopted in 1976, trade unions
enthusiastically used them to complain about labor rights violations,
and approximately 40 decisions stood by 1980.289 Enthusiasm died
soon thereafter when it was realized that CIIME's decisions were not
domestically enforceable; consequently, the complaint mechanism fell
into disuse and was regarded as ineffective.29 ° In reply, the mechanism
was strengthened in 2000.291 One of the Guidelines' earliest claimed
success stories concerns the 2001 complaint against a subsidiary of the
Canadian/Swiss company, First Quantum, operating in Zambia. The
company allegedly threatened to have squatters removed by force from
mining land sold to it pursuant to a government privatization
contract.292 After Oxfam Canada complained to the Canadian NCP and
detailed how First Quantum had fallen afoul of the OECD Guidelines
in several respects, the NCP brought the matter to the attention of First
Quantum, and within 6 months, the subsidiary in question reached an
agreement with the ex-miners association, allowing the squatters to
293
remain.
More recently, significant complaints include those lodged by
NGOs in 2006 with the Dutch NCP against Shell regarding its
operations in the Philippines and Brazil 294 as well as the complaint by
the German Clean Clothes Campaign lodged with the German NCP
288 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 68; OECD Watch, The Confidentiality
Principle, Transparency and the Specific Instance Procedure, Feb. 2006,
http://www.raid-uk.org/docs/Guidelines/TransConfBrief.pdf.
289 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 100-01.
290 Noting that despite the initial enthusiasm lasting until the 1980s, only
two cases were presented under the Guidelines in the 1990s. See IRENE
Report, supra note 74, at 6.
291 See Decision of the Council on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, Procedural Guidance on National Contact Points, OECD Doc. C
(2000)96/FINAL, at 4-5, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/
39/0,3343,en_2649_34889_1933095 11_1_1 ,00.html.
292 OECD Watch, Guide to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises'
Complaint Procedure: Lessonsfrom Past NGO Complaints, Nov. 2006, 28, available
at http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication 1664. See also Laura
Bogomolny, The Aliens are Coming (To Sue You), Corporate Knights, Globalization
Issue, 2004, available at http://www.corporateknights.ca/magazine-issues/52-
2004globalization-issue/145-the-aliens-are-coming-to-sue-you.html.
293 Bogomolny, supra note 292.
294 OECD Watch, OECD Complaints against Shell, May 16, 2006,
http://oecdwatch.org/news-en/oecd-complaints-against-shell.
212 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 6.2
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS
concerning alleged labor rights violations in two Indonesian supplier
factories of Adidas. 295 Perhaps most famous is the 2002 UN Expert
Panel mandated by the UN Security Council to gather information on
all corporate activities of illegal exploitation of natural resources and
other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).296
The resultant report considered that 85 companies operating in the
DRC (of which 57 operated in OECD countries) had contravened the
Guidelines; consequently, the report pushed the shamed companies and
the governments of their home nations into action.297  Most
importantly, the UN Expert Panel explained that it defined "illegality"
as "the violation of international law, including 'soft' law" 298 The UN
Security Council subsequently requested the Expert Panel to provide
the relevant information to the OECD's CIIME and to the concerned
NCPs for further action. 299 Although files were sent to the respective
NCPs, the NCPs' subsequent inaction and failure to trigger
investigations into the allegations of MNC misconduct caused the NCP
and OECD system to come under fire. 300 While some NCPs defended
their inaction by arguing difficulty in obtaining further evidence on
misconduct from the UN Panel, others opined that their role was that of
a mediator and not to investigate and decide if an MNC had breached
the Guidelines in their DRC operations.3 1 In both cases, the NCPs
nevertheless fell short of their international obligations "to conduct
295 Clean Clothes Campaign, Outcome of OECD Complaint Case of
German Clean Clothes Campaign against Adidas Disappointing, Sept. 1, 2004,
http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/ccc/corporate-accountability/full-
package-approach-to-labour-codes-of-conduct/618.
296 See Kuuya, supra note 61, at 29-32.
297 See U.N. Sec. Council, Final Report on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Anx. III, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146, (Oct. 16, 2002).
298 The Secretary-General, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of Congo, 15(d), Apr. 12, 2001,
http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/drcongo.htm.
299 S.C. Res.1457, 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1457 (Jan. 24, 2003).300 See Anna Neistat & Peter Bouckaert, The Curse of Gold: Democratic
Republic of Congo, Human Rights Watch, June 1, 2005,
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/06/0 1/curse-gold.301 Rights & Accountability in Development (RAID), Unanswered
Questions: Companies, Conflict and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mar.
2004, at 4, 7, http://www.raid-uk.org/docsUNPanelDRC/Unanswered_
QuestionsFull.pdf.
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their own investigations, including as appropriate through judicial
means, in order to clarify credibly the findings of the Panel.
3 °0 2
Notwithstanding it weaknesses, this is the only mechanism at the
international level which allows for the direct monitoring of MNC
conduct as a result of individual complaints.30 3 Hence, there remains
the possibility that more cases concerning MNC misconduct could be
presented to the OECD, even if the effect is limited to shaming MNCs
by virtue of bad publicity.
In 1998 the OECD Ministers also adopted the OECD Principles
of Corporate Governance, which were revised in 2004.3 04  The
principles include twelve standards pertinent to, inter alia, MNCs and
transparency and concern issues relevant to a company's decision-
making processes, such as environmental, anti-corruption, or ethical
concerns. They are modeled on other OECD instruments such as the
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Transactions.30 5  Relevantly, Principle IV espouses that where
stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have the
right to communicate their concerns about any illegal and unethical
business activities, as well as the opportunity to obtain effective redress
for violation of their rights. 30 6 However, the Principles of Corporate
Governance are also non-binding.
30 7
c. UN Draft Code of Conduct, UN Norms, and SRSG Ruggie
In the 1990's, endeavoring to produce an international code
governing the conduct of MNCs, the now defunct UN Commission on
Transnational Corporations produced a Draft Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations.30 8 Although the Draft Code of Conduct
ultimately did not come to fruition,30 9 the idea of a code of conduct
302 S.C. Res.1457, 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1457 (Jan. 24, 2003).
303 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 101.
304 OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf.
305 See id. at 12.
306 Id. at 21.
311 Id. at 13.
308 U.N. ESCOR, Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational
Corporations, Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 7, Annex II, U.N. Doc. E/1983/17/Rev.1
(1983), republished at 23 I.L.M. 62 (1984).
309 The Draft Code of Conduct failed due to disagreements between
North/South countries about international law and on the inclusion of standards
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governing MNC accountability was not discarded. The Draft Code of
Conduct was the forerunner to the UN (Draft) Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights310 (Norms) and their
associated Commentary, 311 which the now superseded UN Sub-
Commission of Human Rights adopted in August 2003.312
The Norms were a highly ambitious codification of MNC
responsibilities that went significantly further than the previously
discussed soft law frameworks. While recognizing the primary
responsibility of states in guaranteeing human rights, the Norms
attributed the full gamut of state duties under various human rights
treaties - such as to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill human rights -
to corporations within their "spheres of influence."313 Substantively,
this attribution encompassed five categories of human rights:
3 14
"traditional" civil and political human rights;315 economic and social
of treatment for Transnational Corporations (TNCs). The Secretary-General,
U.N. Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, The Impact of the Activities and Working Methods of Transnational
Corporations on the Full Enjoyment of all Human Rights, in particular
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Right to Development, Bearing
in Mind Existing International Guidelines, Rules and Standards Relating to the
Subject-Matter, 61-62, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/12, July 2, 1996.
310 U.N. Draft Norms, supra note 77. See MUCHLINKSI, supra note 16, at
507. For an introduction to and oversight of the development of the Norms, see
Larry C. Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United
Nations' Norms On The Responsibilities Of Transnational Corporations As A
Harbinger Of Corporate Social Responsibility In International Law, 101
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 287 (2005). For criticism of the Norms and an
account of its substantive and operational shortcomings, see Surya Deva, UN's
Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction? 10 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 493 (2004).311 Commentary on the Norms, supra note 189.
312 U.N. ECOSOC, Draft Report of the Sub-Comm 'n on the Promotion
and Protection of Hum. Rts., 59th Sess., 22d plen. mtg. at 52, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L. I 1 (Aug. 13, 2003).
313 U.N. Draft Norms, supra note 77, 1. See also Justine Nolan, With
Power Comes Responsibility: Human Rights and Corporate Accountability, 28
U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 581 (2005).
314 See MUCHLINSKI, supra note 16, at 521-24.
315 U.N. Draft Norms, supra note 77, 12 (providing for the rights of
equality, freedom from forced labor, freedom of association, to education,
freedom of thought, freedom of opinion and expression).
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rights as conventionally encompassed by the ILO;316 "third generation'
collective rights"; 317 provisions specifically pertinent to the challenges
MNCs face in establishing their commercial operations abroad, such as
securing appropriate security arrangements for their business;318 and
duties touching upon broader issues of corporate social
responsibility.
319
As for accountability mechanisms, the Norms encompassed a
rigorous and multi-layered approach to enforcement, starting with a
degree of self-regulation. The Norms required businesses to internalize
the Norms into their business practices; incorporate the Norms into
future commercial contracts 32 such as to bind all parties to the "rules of
the game,,; 321  periodically report on the progress of their
implementation, which is a requirement for both MNCs and states; and
conduct regular "human rights impact assessments" in order to assess
the impact of their activities on human rights. 322 Further, the Norms
envisaged periodic monitoring and verification of business compliance
with the Norms "by the UN, or even other international and national
316 Id. (including rights such as employment security, wages, benefits and
working conditions, health and safety, freedom of association and collective
bargaining).
317 Id. 1 (providing for rights such as the right to development and the
duty to promote, respect and protect". . . the rights and interests of indigenous
peoples and other vulnerable groups").
318 Id. 4. This means that "security arrangements shall be used only for
preventive or defensive services;" "[s]ecurity personnel shall not violate the
rights of individuals while exercising the rights to freedom of association and
peaceful assembly;" shall refrain from contracting with individuals or State
security forces or contract security firms "known to have been responsible for
human rights or humanitarian law violations;" and corporations using public
security forces to "consult regularly with host governments" and/or
"nongovernmental organizations and communities concerning the impact of
their security arrangements on local communities." Commentary on the Norms,
supra note 189, 4, cmt. (b)-(e).
319 Such as the duty to "act in accordance with fair business, marketing
and advertising practices, . . . to ensure the safety and quality of the goods and
services they provide," and not to "produce, distribute, market, or advertise
harmful or potentially harmful products for use by consumers." Arguably, this
was introduced in order to counter abusive marketing practices by MNCs in
developing countries, such as the marketing of tobacco products by British
American Tobacco, and baby milk products by Nestle. See Id. 13.
320 U.N. Draft Norms, supra note 77, 15.
321 Kuuya, supra note 61, at 33.
322 U.N. Draft Norms, supra note 77, 16.
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mechanisms already in existence or yet to be created. 323 To achieve
these monitoring duties, states were primarily responsible for providing
the "necessary legal and administrative framework" to ensure
implementation of the Norms, and state responsibility may have been
triggered in lieu of MNC responsibility in cases of lapses in
compliance. 324  Perhaps most significantly, the Norms obliged
businesses to "provide prompt, effective and adequate reparation" to be
administered by either national courts, international tribunals, or
both.325  Thus, the Norms explicitly provided a direct right of
compensation for victims, a provision which is otherwise only provided
for in ATCA.
3 26
While the Norms could have been regarded as a first step
towards a binding international treaty, they were met with uproar from
the business community concerning their purported binding nature
327
and received a cool reception by the UN Sub-Commission's parent
body, claiming "this document has not been requested by the
Commission and, as a draft proposal, has no legal standing. 3 28 The
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights subsequently declared the
Norms had no legal standing, and since 2004, there has been no further
work done with respect to the Norms.32 9  Instead, in 2005, at the
request of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 330 the
Secretary-General appointed a Special Representative of the Secretary
General (SRSG) to report on the responsibilities of transnational
corporations. The SRSG is still in the process of completing his
mandate. 331 From the outset, the SRSG has taken a significantly
323 Id.
324 Id. 19; see also Deva, supra note 310, at 514.
325 U.N. Draft Norms, supra note 77, 18.
326 Carolin Hillemanns, UN Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to
Human Rights, 4 GERMAN L.J. 1065, 1078 (2003).
327 Nolan, supra note 313, at 581-82.
328 U.N. ECOSOC, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 60th Sess., 49th plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/DEC/2004/l16 (Apr. 20, 2004) (ruling on the
responsibilities of transnational corporations and related business enterprises
with regard to human rights).
329 See Backer, supra note 310, at n. 186.
330 U.N. ECOSOC, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/L.87 (Apr. 15, 2005).
331 In June 2008, the UN Human Rights Council extended the mandate of
the SRSG until 2011. See SRSG, Prepared Remarks by SRSG John G. Ruggie,
Public Hearings on Business and Human Rights, Sub-Committee on Human
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different stance on the issue of MNC responsibility-more modest and
pragmatic-than was proposed by the Norms.332
SRSG John Ruggie, in addition to the business and international
community, was critical of the Norms for several reasons. Firstly, he
opined that the elevation by the Norms of MNCs to the role of states,
insofar as they thrust all state-based human rights obligations on
MNCs, had "little authoritative basis in international law - hard, soft or
otherwise. 333  Secondly, the concept of an MNC's "sphere of
influence" was elusive and resulted in "imprecision in allocating human
rights responsibilities to States and corporations." 334 Thus, from the
outset the SRSG distanced himself from the Norm's utopian ideas.
In contrast to the Norms, SRSG Ruggie adopted a much more
modest and pragmatic approach to MNC obligations based on three
pillars: the state's duty to protect its citizens, the MNCs responsibility
to respect human rights, and the need to ensure effective access to
remedies.335 Thus, the SRSG's three pillars clearly sidestep the biggest
criticism leveled upon the Norms, namely that they failed to distinguish
between state and MNC responsibilities. The SRSG embraces the
traditional view of states as the primary protector of human rights
obligations and only envisages a narrower (and more realistic) role for
MNCs limited to respect for human rights, as opposed to contributing
336to their realization. Moreover, in contrast to the Norms' "imprecise
and expansive responsibilities," the SRSG has pushed for a definition
of "the specific responsibilities of companies with regard to all
Rights, European Parliament, (April 16, 2009) (prepared by John G. Ruggie),
available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-remarks-to-
European-Parliament- 1 6-Apr-2009.pdf.
332 I thank Larissa van den Herik for a clarification in respect to this point.
See Jens Martens & Elisabeth Strohscheidt eds., Problematic Pragmatism-The
Ruggie Report 2008: Background, Analysis and Perspectives, June 2008, at 3-
4, available at http://www.cidse.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/
Publication repository/policypaperMisereorbackgroundRuggie reportjun
e08_EN.pdf.
333 U.N. ECOSOC, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 60, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97
(Feb. 22, 2006) [hereinafter SRSG Ruggie, Interim Report].
334 Id. at 66. Larissa van den Herik, Corporate Policy, Corporate
Liability and Human Rights: The State of the Art, 4 (Paper presented to a
conference on Transnational Business and Intemational Criminal Law,
Humboldt Universitit zu Berlin, May, 14-16 2009).
335 SRSG Ruggie, Report, supra note 84.
336 Cf U.N. Draft Norms, supra note 77, 1.
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rights. 337 In defining a company's specific responsibilities, the SRSG
advocates a "due diligence" process that outlines "the steps a company
must take to become aware of, prevent and address adverse human
rights impacts. 338 Based in part on information gained from an earlier
study, the recommendation revealed that MNCs in different sectors
were more likely than others to commit certain human rights
violations, 339 thus illustrating the need for each MNC to exercise due
diligence to ensure that it does not contribute to or benefit from specific
human rights abuses.
When it comes to accountability mechanisms, the difference
between the Norms and the SRSG's approach is even more patent.
While one of the central pillars of SRSG Ruggie's approach is the
provision of effective remedies for rights violations, in contrast to the
Norm's ambitions for a wide-ranging and legally binding set of rules,
the SRSG has nevertheless refrained from reinventing the wheel under
international law to put a remedial system in motion. Instead, in
recognition of the fact that "judicial mechanisms are often under-
equipped to provide effective remedies for victims of corporate
abuse," 340 the SRSG advocates strengthening domestic judicial
systems; reducing the obstacles to accessing justice; and reviving
alternative non-judicial structures, such as the OECD, NCPs, and
National Human Rights Institutes 34' because "[t]he actual and potential
importance of these institutions cannot be overstated.,
342
The SRSG's only innovation directly concerning MNCs has been
a proposal to establish a "global ombudsman function that could
receive and handle complaints" against MNCs.343 As expected, this
337 SRSG Ruggie, Report, supra note 84, 51.338 Id. 56.
339 See SRSG Ruggie, Interim Report, supra note 333, 1 24-29. The oil,
gas, and mining sectors, the food and beverage industry, the apparel and
footwear industry, and the information and communication technology sector
are identified as the most common offenders of human rights. Id. 1 25. van
den Herik, Corporate Policy, supra note 334, at 5.
340 SRSG Ruggie, Report, supra note 84, 188.3411Id. 11 91, 99.
342 Id. 97.
141 Id. 103. Other "international" proposals do not focus on MNCs per se
but rather on state obligations. See Martens & Strohscheidt, supra note 332, at
13-14. They include fostering sustainability reporting, including human rights-
related clauses in newly negotiated Bilateral Investment Treaties between
governments and MNCs, as well as making satisfaction of human rights
obligations a prerequisite to the grant of governmental export credits. Id. at 13.
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proposal, like the Norms, was met with severe criticism from the
business community. 3" This aversion and the other recent
developments in MNC regulation discussed here show that both states
and MNCs are far from ready to accept a greater role for MNCs insofar
as human rights protection is concerned, least of all in connection with
a direct complaints mechanism at the international level.
d. UN Global Compact
The Global Compact (GC), established in 1999, was primarily
the brainchild of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who
throughout his tenure sought to introduce businesses into the UN
framework as "partners" in hopes of fostering corporate behaviors that
would respect "the principles enshrined in the UN Charter."3 45 The GC
encourages MNCs to respect, in their corporate practices, its ten "core
principles," including support and respect for human rights, respect for
basic labor rights, and the adoption of anti-corruption and pro-
environmental principles. 346 Like the UN Norms, the GC principles
lack clarity and precision as to precisely which human rights MNCs
should support and respect.
347
Notwithstanding its good intentions, the GC is a voluntary
scheme without any mandatory enforcement or monitoring
mechanisms. 348 Participation in the GC requires an MNC to do little
more than send to the UN Secretary-General an expression of intent to
integrate GC principles into the corporation's operations, publicly
promote the GC principles in its publications, publish a summary of
how the company is working to advance the GC principles in its annual
report, and participate in GC policy dialogues and operational
activities. 349  Lobbying by GC critics urging the UN to formally
344 Martens & Strohscheidt, supra note 332, at 12.
345 Jackie Smith, Power, Interests, and the United Nations Global
Compact, (Paper presented at ISA's 49th Annual Convention, Bridging
Multiple Divides (March 26, 2008)),
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla apa researchcitation/2/5/2/0/9/p252
098 index.html.346See U.N. Global Compact: The Ten Principles,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html
(last visited June 1, 2010).
347 See Nolan, supra note 313, at 588.
348 UN Procurement Div., The Global Compact,
http://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/global.htm (last visited June 1, 2010).
349 See id.
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monitor claims of corporate compliance with the GC's human rights
and environmental sustainability norms has been met with resistance by
the business community,350 and the UN has acquiesced to the resistance
of its "corporate partners." 351 Thus, insofar as the GC overtly denies
any responsibility for monitoring or ensuring corporate compliance
with global norms, 352 it serves little purpose in filling the accountability
lacuna under international law.
353
In response to critics' allegations that the GC also allowed MNCs
to profit from beneficial publicity derived from their proclaimed but
unverified allegiance to UN principles, 354 the GC introduced "integrity
measures" in 2005 to protect against misuse of the UN name.355 The
measures allow individuals, groups, and organizations to complain
about systematic and egregious abuse of the GC's principles against
companies that claim to adhere to them.356  The aim behind the
measures is to engage the company in "dialogue" about the questioned
behavior in order to encourage resolution.357 The consequence for
companies that refuse to engage in "dialogue" include being labeled as
"not-communicating" or being disassociated with the GC, i.e., by
removal from the GC's website.358 The UN does not intend for the
measures to affect its formal stance that the GC "is not now and does
not aspire to become a compliance based initiative, 359 and the
measures do not otherwise affect regulatory or legal procedures in any
jurisdiction. 360 Lastly, while GC participation has increased since its
inception in 2000,361 "such corporate participation represents a very
350 Smith, supra note 345, at 6.
351 Id. at 8.
352 Id.; see also U.N. Global Compact: Integrity Measures,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AbouttheGC/IntegrityMeasures/index.ht
ml (last visited June 1, 2010) [hereinafter Integrity Measures].
353 Smith, supra note 345, at 8.
354 Id. at 6.
... Id. at 15.
356 Id. cmt. 49.
351 Id. cmts. 55, 49.
358 Integrity Measures, supra note 352.
359 Id.
360 Id.
361 There are currently approximately 5,936 listed business participants.
See UN Global Compact, Participant Search, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
participants/search (last visited June 1, 2010) [hereinafter Participant Search].
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small tip of a very large iceberg"3362 when compared to the total number
of existing INCs worldwide.363
The GC does provide for annual self-reporting under its
"Communication on Progress" (COP) mechanism, which requires
member MNCs to detail their efforts to institutionalize the GC
principles. 364 However, of the companies currently participating in the
GC, 5,936,365 1,251, or one-fifth, are non-communicating participants,
i.e. have failed to report by the deadline in a given year. 366 Since 2006,
the GC withdrew the memberships of 778 companies for their failures
to file the requisite performance reports.
367
The lack of reliable mechanisms for reporting non-compliance
with the principles indicates that the GC is not proving to be an
effective mechanism for MNC accountability. This weakness is
aggravated considering that the GC was espoused as an initiative of the
UN Secretariat and not the General Assembly. Consequently, the GC
is not accountable to any UN organ other than its own Global Compact
Office, which, despite being endorsed by the UN General Assembly
368
and otherwise generally being associated with the UN name, operates
in a vacuum within the UN operational and legal framework.369
More recently, the Second Global Compact Leaders Summit in
2007, attended by political leaders and business leaders from diverse
companies such as Coca-Cola, Levi Strauss & Co., Ldckeby Water
Group, Nestl6 S.A., SABMiller, and Suez,370 adopted the twenty-one
362 Smith, supra note 345, at 10.
363 "In 2005, there were approximately 77,000 MNCs, with 770,000
foreign affiliates." Jonathan Clough, Punishing the Parent: Corporate Criminal
Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 33 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 899, 899.
364 Integrity Measures, supra note 352.
365 A participant search of the GC Database allows visitors to search for
the total number of participants, as well as those who are either active or non-
communicating. See Participant Search, supra note 361 (last visited June 1,
2010).366U.N. Global Compact, Non-Communicating Participants,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/COP/noncommunicating.htm (last visited
June 1, 2010)
367 Smith, supra note 345, at 11.
368 See G.A. Res. 60/215, 8-10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/215 (Mar. 29,
2006).
369 Smith, supra note 345, at 15.
370 The Global Compact Leaders Summit, Geneva, Switz., July 5-6, 2007,
Facing Realities: Getting Down to Business, Annex 4 [hereinafter Facing
Realities].
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point Geneva Declaration. 371 The Geneva Declaration expounds that
"globalization, if rooted in universal principles, has the power to
improve our world fundamentally--delivering economic and social
benefits to people, communities and markets everywhere."37 2 In that
spirit, the Declaration confirms the principles of the GC and urges that
business should commit to its ten principles.
373
e. The World Bank Group
The World Bank Group (Group) is collectively formed by the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
(informally, the World Bank), the International Development
Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the
International Center for the Settlement of Disputes. 374 While the first
two institutions primarily lend funds to the governments of developing
nations, 375 the third and fourth institutions lend to private parties.
376
The Group's overall goal is to alleviate poverty in developing countries
and promote economic development that is environmentally and
socially responsible via infrastructure projects.377 Recognizing that the
Group's institutions are major providers of financial and technical
assistance, UN agencies have urged the Group to harness its influence
to further compliance with international law.378  The UN Sub-
371 UN Global Compact, News & Events: UN Global Compact Leaders
Summit 2007,
http://unglobalcompact.org/NewsAndEvents/event-archives/Leaders-Summit-
2007.html (last visited June 1,2010).
372 Facing Realities, supra note 368, Annex 3, pmbl., para. 2.373 See id. para. 10.
374 The World Bank, About Us, paras. 2-4,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:5
0004410-piPK:36602-theSitePK:29708,00.htm (last visited June 1, 2010)
375 Id.
376 See Int'l Fin. Corp. [IFC], About IFC: What We Do,
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/about.nsf/Content/WhatWeDo (last visited June 1,
2010); Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency [MIGA),
http://www.miga.org/about/index sv.cfm?stid= 1736 (last visited June 1, 2010).
377 The World Bank, About Us, supra note 374.
378 ECOSOC, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Report of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its Forty-Sixth
Session, Aug. 1-26, 1994, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56
(October 28, 1994) [hereinafter Report of Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities]. "The Commission on Human
Rights, noting resolution 1994/37 of 26 August 1994 of the Sub-Commission
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Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has also
urged UN financial agencies, such as the IBRD and IDA,379 to integrate
human rights into their mandates.38°
Accordingly, the Group's individual institutions have also
introduced programs dedicated to creating and promoting an ethical
code for businesses.3 8 ' The Group's institutions have produced
guidelines that concern several independent fields and outline certain
requirements that must be satisfied before and during project
financing.38 2 These guidelines and their underlying policies address
environmental protection, sustainable development, and the protection
of indigenous peoples and reflect general principles of international law
although they do not explicitly refer to them.38 3 In order to strengthen
the guidelines and increase borrower accountability, the Group
provides two grievance mechanisms that allow for individual
complaints concerning major projects.384 The Inspection Panel (Panel),
established in 1994, receives complaints concerning loans under the
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, endorses the
requests of the Sub-Commission and decides to: [ ...] (e) Request the
international financial institutions, in particular the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, to develop
independent mechanisms designed to ensure that international human rights
standards are taken fully into account in the adoption of all relevant policies,
projects and practices and that these standards are fully respected in this
regard." Id.
379 The IBRD and IDA have a special relationship with the UN and are
collectively recognized as an independent specialized UN agency. World
Bank, About Us supra note 374.
380 Report of Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, supra note 376. "4. Encourages the United Nations
Children's Fund, the United Nations Development Programme, the regional
commissions, the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization
and other relevant international programmes and agencies to integrate human
rights concerns into their respective mandates" Id.
381 ILO, Governance, International Law & Corporate Social
Responsibility, Research Series 116, 1-2 (2008) [hereinafter ILO, Governance].
382 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 106. See The World Bank-IBRD & IDA:
Working for a World Free of Poverty, Topics in Development,
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/thematic.htm (last visited June 1, 2010).
383 Susan Park, Assessing the Accountability of the World Bank Group 3,
11-12 (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual
Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides, San Francisco, March 26, 2008).
384 See ICHRP, supra note 12, at 106.
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IDA or IBRD. 385 After the Group created the Panel, other development
banks established similar accountability mechanisms. 386 The
establishment of a Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) to govern
complaints concerning the IFC and the MIGA followed the
establishment of the Panel 1999.387 Each mechanism will be discussed
in turn below.
i. The IBRD and the Panel
The Panel receives complaints on alleged violations by
borrowers of IBRD policies touching a range of issues. The IBRD has
formulated an Environment Strategy, which acknowledges the links
between the environment, poverty, and development. 388  The
Environment Strategy aims to improve the quality of life, improve the
quality of growth, and protect the quality of the regional and global
commons.3 9 The IBRD has also drafted Operational Policies (OPs)
and Bank Procedures (BPs) which guide the Bank's lending operations
and ensure that potentially adverse environmental and social
385 The Inspection Panel, About Us, http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,menuPK:64129249-pag
ePK:64132081-piPK:64132052-theSitePK:380794,00.html (last visited June
1,2010).
386See, e.g., Business and Society Exploring Solutions, the Inter-American
Development Bank, http://baseswiki.org/en/Inter-American Development_
Bank_(IDB),_IndependentInvestigation Mechanism (handling 5 complaints
since 1994); the Asian Development Bank, http://baseswiki.org/en/
Asian DevelopmentBank(ADB): AccountabilityMechanism ("replacing
the Inspection Function" which was established in 2005 with its Accountability
Mechanism on May 29, 2003); the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development; http://baseswiki.org/en/European Bank for Reconstruction_
andDevelopment_(EBRD) (handling 1-2 complaints with its Independent
Recourse Mechanism since 2004); the African Development Bank
http://baseswiki.org/en/AfricanDevelopment Bank(AfDB):_IndependentRe
viewMechanism ("provid[ing] people adversely affected by a project financed
by the Bank Group with an independent mechanism through which they can
request the Bank Group to comply with its own policies and procedures").
387 Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, About the CAO, http://www.cao-
ombudsman.org/.388See The World Bank, Making Sustainable Commitments: An
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consequences are identified, minimized, and mitigated.390 For example,
the OP 4.01 and BP 4.01 on Environmental Assessment 391 provide a




such that Bank-funded projects are screened for their potential
environmental impacts, extending to potential physical, biological,
socio-economic, and cultural resources impacts.393 Thus, the IBRD has
tied lending to states with the condition of continuous compliance with
obligations imposed by environmental agreements. 394 If a borrower
breaches the condition, the IBRD can cancel the loan and demand its
repayment.
395
The IBRD has also developed a series of Indigenous Peoples and
Physical Cultural Resources policies, including its 2005 Revised OP
4.10 on Indigenous Peoples. 396 These policies promote consultation
with, and participation of, indigenous peoples in IBRD-financed
operations in order to ensure that adverse impacts to such groups are
minimized or mitigated, if not avoided altogether.397 Additionally, OP
4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement aims to improve or, at a minimum,
restore the standards of living of people whose homes or livelihoods are
390 The World Bank, Operational and Safeguard Policies,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/0
,,contentMDK:20124313-menuPK:549278-pagePK: 148956-piPK:216618-the
SitePK:244381,00.html (last visited June 1, 2010).
391 See World Bank, Operational and Safeguard Policies, Environmental
Assessment,http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIR
ONMENT/EXTENVASS/0,,menuPK:407994-pagePK: 149018-piPK: 149093-
theSitePK:407988,00.html (last visited June 1,2010).
392 See id.
393 Id.
394 See Peter H. Sand, Institution-Building to Assist Compliance with
International Environmental Law: Perspectives, 56 ZAORV HEIDELBERG J.
INT'L L., 774, 774-81 (1996); Mohammed Abdelwahah Bekhechi, Some
Observations Regarding Environmental Covenants and Conditionalities in
World Bank Lending Activities, 3 Max Planck U.N.Y.B.L. 287, 287-314 (1999).
395 Dr. Nele Matz, Financial and Other Incentives for Complying with
MEA Obligations, in ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH MULTILATERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN PRACTITIONERS AND
ACADEMIA 301-18, 313 (Beryerlin, Stoll, & Wolfrum eds., 2006).
396 See The World Bank, Policies, OP 4.10-Indigenous Peoples,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/
EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:20553653-pagePK:64141683-piPK:64141
620-theSitePK:502184,00.html (last visited June 1, 2010).
397 Id.
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destroyed or adversely affected by IBRD-financed projects. The
policy recommends compensation and resettlement measures and
requires that borrowers prepare adequate resettlement planning
instruments prior to IBRD appraisal of proposed projects.399
The Panel also receives complaints regarding alleged violations
of the IRBD's policies on labor rights. In December 2006, after years
of refusing to make financial lending conditional upon respect for labor
standards, the IBRD announced that it would pursue cooperation with
various other development banks for purposes of progressing and
implementing the fundamental principles codified in the 1998 ILO
Declaration. 40 0 This commitment illustrates the IBRD's progressive
move towards including international labor standards in its financing
operations, as well as towards closer cooperation between the ILO and
the IBRD.4° ' Indeed, the ILO has noted that there is an increasing trend
amongst development banks to include international labor standards in
their lending operations. 402 The IBRD has also established a Global
Child Labour Program to proactively address the issue of child labor.
40 3
Moreover, the IBRD has increasingly engaged in dialogue with trade
unions to further develop its labor policies. 4°
The Panel is the complaints mechanism for breaches of IBRD
guidelines. The Panel was born from the realization that project-
398 See The World Bank, Involuntary Resettlement,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVE
LOPMENT/EXTINVRES/O,,menuPK:410241-pagePK: 149018-piPK: 149093
-theSitePK:410235,00.html (last visited June 1, 2010).
399 Id.
400 See ILO, Governance, supra note 381, at 88, n.16 (citing official
minutes of the meeting of 13 December 2006 in Washington DC between Mr.
Paul Wolfowitz and representatives of the International Trade Union
Confederation). See also Hans-Michael Wolffgang & Wolfram Feurhake, Core
Labour Standards in World Trade Law: The Necessity for Incorporation of
Core Labour Standards in the World Trade Organisation, 36 J. WORLD TRADE
36(5) 883 (2002).
401 Wolffgang & Feurhake, supra note 400, at 888-89.
402 ILO, Governance, supra note 381, at 89.
4 03See The World Bank, Child Labor,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTWEBA
RCHIVES/0,,MDK:22199444-menuPK:64654237-pagePK:64660187-piPK:6
4660385-theSitePK:2564958,00.html (last visited June 4, 2010).
404 See Meetings Between the International Trade Union Movement
(ITUC/GLOBAL UNIONS) and the IMF and World Bank, Washington, Dec.
10-11, 2007, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLM/Resources/GU-
IFI JointReportl 2-07.pdf.
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financing often overlooked environmental and social considerations as
well as the needs of locally-affected communities. 40 5 Consequently, the
Panel allows a party negatively affected by a specific IBRD guideline
or IDA-financed project to seek redress by lodging a "Request for
Inspection," technically a complaint against the IBRD itself for an
alleged breach of its own environmental or social policies. 4 6 The
Panel is an independent, fact-finding body that reports directly to the
Board of Directors of the IBRD.407 If the Board of Directors approves
a recommendation by the Panel to investigate the alleged violation, the
Panel has full authority to do so. 40 8 An investigation consists of an in-
country visit, during which the Panel meets with the complainants and
those responsible for the project, confidentially interviews IBRD staff,
and reviews related IBRD files. 40 9 The Panel's investigation may take
up to a year and concludes with the presentation of its final report as to
whether IBRD policies have been complied with in the specific
circumstances. 4 10  In turn, the IBRD's senior management gives
recommendations, usually in the form of an Action Plan, as to how to
remedy any breach of IBRD's policies. 411 Strictly speaking, the Panel
has no independent authority-its reports are non-binding, and it
cannot offer complainants any remedies.41 2 Its main strength is to
pressure Management to reform or to withdraw from a given project.4 13
To date, the Panel's focus concerns alleged violations of the IBRD's
environmental policies and involuntary resettlement policy.
4 14
Insofar as the IBRD's main clients are developing countries, not
private actors, the Panel is not the best suited mechanism for providing
direct MNC accountability. Indeed, the IBRD guidelines and directives
are only intended to check the IBRD's external accountability, i.e., the
IBRD's accountability vis-A-vis project-affected individuals. 4 " Thus,
the guidelines and standards are not legally binding on third party
405 Park, supra note 383, at 11-12.
406Business and Society Exploring Solutions, World Bank Inspection
Panel, http://baseswiki.org/en/World BankInspectionPanel (last visited June






412 BASES, Panel, supra note 406.
413 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 109.
414 Park, supra note 383, at 14.
415 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 106-07.
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MNCs. 3 58 However, in cases in which the Panel finds the IBRD has
breached its policies through lending connected with MNC misconduct,
resulting in either the IBRD's withdrawal from the project or the
blocking of the MNC's participation in future IBRD-funded projects,
416
the Panel is a suitable mechanism for ensuring MNC conduct does not
fall afoul of accepted standards, even if it cannot provide judicial
remedies.
417
ii. The IFC, MIGA, and the CAO
In contrast to the IBRD, whose traditional clients are developing
states, the IFC and MIGA contract with private sector clients. The IFC
and MIGA seek to directly condition the activities of their private
sector partners by imposing performance standards, the satisfaction of
which is a prerequisite to the grant of IFC investment funds. 418 The
IFC has specifically developed eight Performance Standards, which
define MNC roles and responsibilities for managing projects and
requirements for receiving and retaining IFC support. 419 These
standards touch issues faced by MNCs in diverse areas, including social
and environmental impact; labor and working conditions; community
health, safety, and security; land acquisition and involuntary
resettlement; indigenous Peoples; and cultural heritage.420  The IFC
reviews all projects proposed for direct financing against its
Performance Standards.42 1  The Performance Standards are
complemented by other IFC policy-setting documents, such as its




417 Id. at 108-09.
418 Hum. Rts. Council Report, supra note 8, at 15-16; Business and
Society Exploring Solutions, Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO),
http://baseswiki.org/en/WorldBank Group:_Compliance Advisor/Ombudsma
n_(CAO) (last visited June 4, 2010) [hereinafter BASES, CAO].
419 IFC, Performance Standards and Guidance Notes on Social &
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Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines (EHS Guidelines).423
The IFC claims that its Environmental and Social (E&S) Review
Procedure, an internal procedure which is tantamount to due diligence,
ensures respect of its Performance Standards vis-A-vis all of its
investments activities.424  The IFC Performance Standards are
mandatory for the IFC and contractually binding on its MNC clients.425
Similarly, the IFC's sister agency, the MIGA, has developed
Environmental and Social Review Procedures and Safeguard Policies,
modeled on the Performance Standards of the IFC, which bind its
private sector clients.426 The MIGA otherwise follows the IFC's
Performance Standards and EHS Guidelines.427
MNC compliance with both IFC and MIGA standards is subject
to review by the CAO.428 The CAO may hear complaints from anyone
adversely affected by the actual or potential social or environmental
effects of either an IFC or MIGA-funded project.429 The CAO office
represents a two-tiered mechanism. First, the Ombudsman assesses a
complaint and the office seeks a solution under the Ombudsman's
guidance. The complaining party and the parties involved in the
project may agree to any resolution under the Ombudsman's
supervision.430 In the event that the conciliation process under the
Ombudsman is unsuccessful, the complaint may be forwarded to the
CAO's Compliance section which results in public findings, not against
the MNC in question, but against the IFC or MIGA.431 That is, like
423 IFC, Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines,
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/Content/EHSGuidelines (last visited
June 4, 2010).
424 IFC, IFC Environmental and Social Review Procedures, Version 4.0,
Aug. 14, 2009, 8-9, available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/polESRP2009
/$FILE/ESRP2009.pdf.
425 BASES, CAO, supra note 418.
426 MIGA, Projects, Environmental & Social Safeguards, 5,
http://www.miga.org/policies/index sv.cfm?stid=1683 (last visited June 4,
2010).
427 Id.
428 CAO, How We Work: Compliance, http://www.cao-
ombudsman.org/howwework/compliance/ (last visited June 4, 2010).
429 CAO, How We Work: Ombudsman, http://www.cao-
ombudsman.org/howwework/ombudsman/ (last visited June 4, 2010).
430 BASES, CAO, supra note 418.
431 r,
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with the Panel, the CAO only assesses the IFC or MIGA's compliance
with its own standards and policies.432
iii. Fraud, Corruption, and the Department of Institutional
Integrity
The IBRD established the Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) in
2001 to combat fraud and corruption by parties involved in IBRD
lending, including its staff.433  To this end, the IBRD's 2004
Procurement Guidelines434 and Consultants Guidelines435 seek to
standardize contracts that IBRD borrowers enter into with third parties
for purposes of the project for which the money was borrowed. The
sets of guidelines regulate a borrower's procurement of goods and
services and its selection and employment of consultants, respectively.
In addition to advocating that procurement and consultant contracts be
granted after taking into consideration quality and costs, both sets of
guidelines prohibit general fraud and corruption (actual and attempted)
in any step of the realization of the lending project. The sets of
guidelines require not only the borrower but also bidders, suppliers,
contractors, and subcontractors,436 as well as consultants and their
subcontractors,437 to observe the highest standard of ethics during the
pursuit and execution of IBRD-financed contracts and thereby forbid a
range of criminal acts.
438
432 id.
433 The World Bank, Integrity Vice Presidency,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZ
ATION/ORGUNITS/EXTDOII/O,,contentMDK:2054200 1-pagePK:64168427
-piPK:64168435-theSitePK:588921,00.html (last visited June 4, 2010).
434 IBRDiThe World Bank, Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans
and IDA Credit, May 2004, revised in Oct. 2006 & May 2010,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/Procurem
ent-May-2004.pdf [hereinafter Procurement Guidelines].
435 IBRD/The World Bank, Guidelines: Selection and Employment of
Consultants by World Bank Borrowers, May 2004, revised in Oct. 2006,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/Consultan
t-May-2004.pdf [hereinafter Consultants Guidelines].
436 Procurement Guidelines, supra note 434, at 10-11.
437 Consultants Guidelines, supra note 435, at 8-9.
438 Inter alia, bid manipulation, collusion, coercive practices, fraudulent
bids, cost or labor mischarges, product substitution, using substandard or
inferior parts or materials, bribery or acceptance of gratuities and abuses of
authority. For a complete list, see The World Bank, Integrity Vice Presidency,
Report Suspected Fraud or Corruption, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITSEXTDOII/O,,co
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While some commentators claim that guidelines do little more
than encourage compliance by borrowers, 439 in 2006, the IBRD
reformed and expanded its sanctions process440 and provided a new
two-tiered sanction mechanism. 441  Under this system, suspected
breaches of the guidelines can be reported to the iNT, which can
investigate alleged fraud or corruption. 42 If the INT concludes that
wrongdoing has occurred, the responsible parties are subjected to
administrative sanctions overseen by the sanctions process's second
tier, the Office of Evaluation and Suspension (OES). 443 Sanctions may
include debarment, either permanent or temporary. 444  Debarment
means that such companies are thereafter disqualified from World Bank
financing. The objective is to prevent and deter fraud and corruption in
projects financed by the IBRD.445 At the present date, 161 companies
are debarred under this procedure. 446 Further, the 2006 amendments
now provide for sanctions against companies that undertake
"[o]bstructive practices" in an attempt to hinder corruption allegations,
for example by destroying evidence of corruption or intimidating
ntentMDK:20659616-menuPK: 1702202-pagePK:64168445-piPK:64168309-
theSitePK:588921,00.html (last visited June, 2010).
439 ICHRP, supra note 12, 106.
440 The World Bank, Information Note for Borrowers, Sanctions Reform:
Expansion of Sanctions Regime Beyond Procurement and Sanctioning of
Obstructive Practices, July 28, 2006, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
PROJECTS/Resources/409401173795340221/SanctionsReformNoteBorrowers
.pdf [hereinafter Sanctions Reform Information Note].
441 The World Bank, Sanctions System at the World Bank,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZ
ATION/ORGUNITS/EXTOFFEVASUS/O,,menuPK:3601066-pagePK:641684
27-piPK:64168435-theSitePK:3601046,00.html (last visited June 4, 2010).442 id.
443 The World Bank, INT, Sanctions System Flowchart,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOFFEVASUS/Resources/SanctionsPro
cessFlowchart withETS_7.16.09.pdf?resourceurlname=SanctionsProcess_
FlowchartwithETS_7.16.09.pdf (last visited June 4, 2010).




(last visited June 4,2010).
445 Id.
446 The World Bank, World Bank Listing of Ineligible Firms, Fraud and
Corruption, httpJ/web.worldbank.org/extemal/default/main?pagePK=64148989
&piPK=64148984&theSitePK=84266&theSitePK=84266&contentMDK=64069844
&querycontentMDK=64069700&sup name=&supp country=&sorton=SUPP NA
ME&sortorder-ascending&sortdata=text (last visited June 4, 2010).
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witnesses. 4 7 Moreover, under the IBRD's and the IDA's standard loan
agreements, fraud and corruption warrant either suspension4 8 or
cancellation"49 of the loan.
5. CONCLUSIONS ON CURRENT DIRECT AND INDIRECT
OBLIGATIONS PLACED ON MNCS
Part I has shown that numerous fields of law provide a legal basis
for applying international law obligations to MNCs both directly and
indirectly. Additionally, it has shown that, while numerous multilateral
instruments at the international and regional level have provisions
concerning corporate criminal liability for a variety of specific
international offenses,50 human rights law, environmental law and
labor law each offer their own specific mechanisms governing MNC
conduct, each meeting with qualified degrees of success.
In the field of human rights, notwithstanding numerous universal
and human rights instruments, MNC accountability can only be
achieved indirectly through regulation of states. 451  Relevant UN
human rights bodies increasingly advocate that MNCs shoulder
responsibilities; however their General Comments and
Recommendations are plagued by ambiguity insofar as they dub MNC
obligations as voluntary in the same breath. Further, the only
instrument that envisaged direct accountability, the UN Norms, has no
legal standing and has been discredited by both the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights and the current SRSG.
The availability of remedies for labor violations is no better than
for human rights violations. Notwithstanding the existence of the ILO,
MNC accountability is largely only possible via indirect means. The
same holds true under the NAALC and its NAOs.
447 Sanctions Reform Information Note, supra note 440, at 5.
448 IBRD, General Conditions for Loan s, § 7.02 (c), July 1 2005, as
amended through Feb. 12, 2008, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTTOPGENCON/Resources/IBRD GC 05 Feb08.pdf [hereinafter IBRD
General Conditions]; Int'l Dev. Assoc. [IDA], General Conditions for Credits
and Grants, § 6.02(c), July 1, 2005, as amended through Oct. 15, 2006,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPGENCON/Resources/IDAGC 05
Rev.pdf [hereinafter IDA General Conditions].
449 IBRD General Conditions, supra note 448, § 7.03 (c); IDA §6.03(c).
450 Bert Swart, International Trends towards Establishing Some Form of
Punishment for Corporations, 6 J. INT'L CrIM. JUST. 947, 949 (2008);
Stephens, supra note 30, at 69. See supra Part II.A. & nn. 476-78.
451 See SRSG Ruggie, Report, supra note 84, 9, 18.
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The issue of MNC liability appears to have found better footing
in the field of environmental law insofar as the "polluter pays"
principle is a fundamental cornerstone, and numerous international
instruments impose liability on "operators," usually corporations. All
other INC regulation, for example under NAFTA, the NAEEC, and
the Aarhus Convention, is indirect, secondary, and only enforceable in
domestic legal systems, thus making effective enforcement dependent
upon adequate legal structures and remedies at the domestic level.
As for soft-law frameworks, despite a plethora of criticisms, their
utility should not be under-estimated. The most respected instruments
to date are the oft-cited ILO Tripartite Declaration and the OECD
Guidelines. While the former only provides for requests for
interpretation, the latter's individual complaint system allows for direct
complaints against a broad range of MNC misconduct (human rights
and labor-related violations) as opposed to indirect complaints of a
state's failure to comply with its international obligations. Moreover,
the utility provided by the OECD Guidelines' extra-territorial
application overcomes its drawbacks, namely that their effectiveness
depends on political pressure and a state's willingness to act or that
they have not yet provided a uniform degree of success. The Draft
Fundamental Human Rights Principles for Business Enterprises and the
UN Global Compact otherwise provide all-inclusive codifications of
companies' obligations under international law. Despite their present
non-binding nature and limited participation as far as the Global
Compact is concerned, they undoubtedly increase awareness of the
trend towards MNC accountability and could even set the stage for a
future convention on MNC accountability.
452
With regard to the major international financial institutions,
notwithstanding the potential that each of the Group's procedures offers
in terms of MNC accountability, two observations are important. First,
neither the Panel nor the CAO provides for direct MNC accountability.
Rather each ensures the IBRD's accountability vis-A-vis project-
affected individuals. Each allows for complaints concerning the actual
or potential adverse effects of major development projects and thereby
only indirectly affects companies engaged in their implementation, who
may then be found guilty of misconduct and find their project funding
452 See also Halina Ward, Corporate Accountability in Search of a Treaty?
Some Insights from Foreign Direct Liability. No. 4, Royal Inst. of Int'l Affairs,
May 2002, at 9-10.
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withdrawn.453 Notably, the IBRD's power in cases of fraud and
corruption by MNCs is significantly more robust.
Secondly, both the Panel and the CAO are, strictly-speaking,
designed to ensure compliance with IBRD mandated policies and
guidelines, rather than general principles of international law
concerning corruption, labor, or the environment.454 However, insofar
as IBRD policies and guidelines are clearly based on general principles
of international law, 455 such a distinction may well be academic.
The foregoing demonstrates that considerable attempts have been
made across various fields of law to bring INCs into the fold of
international law and thereby fill the MNC-accountability lacuna.
Despite these attempts, the unilateral application of international law
norms to MNCs remains a contested debate, in some fields more so
than others. Given such controversy, it is hardly surprising that
attempts to develop corporate accountability mechanisms at the
international level have also been so fragmented. The foregoing review
best illustrates the conclusion of SRSG Ruggie: "[T]his patchwork of
mechanisms remains incomplete and flawed," and it "must be
improved in its parts and as a whole. 456 The question remains: How?
II. COMPLICITY, CORPORATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: Is THIS THE WAY FORWARD?
The patchwork and field-specific nature of international law
norms discussed in Part I illustrate the complexity of finding one
overarching framework for MNC accountability. The sheer variety of
norms mirrors the extensive variety of MNC activities and the
numerous ways that MNC activities can touch the lives of the societies
in which they operate both directly (employees and their families) and
indirectly (the public effects of their activities). Consistent with this
extreme variety of manners of corporate affectation and of international
law norms, there is a range of available means-albeit limited in
number and underdeveloped-to hold MNCs responsible under
international law.
453 ICHRP, supra note 12, at 108-09.
454 Park, supra note 383, at 8.
455 Id.
456 SRSG Ruggie, Report, supra note 84, at T 87 (discussing the
availability of damage compensation instruments in the field of human rights).
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In connection with this framework of varying accountability
mechanisms, it is necessary to question why the ICJ's Expert Panel
Report focuses on MNC "complicity" as the primary means of securing
MNC accountability. Does it envisage international criminal law
(ICL), in which complicity predominantly appears, as the framework
through which all MNC wrongful acts can best be regulated? In order
to answer that question, section A will review the norms of
international criminal law, which apply to MNCs. Sections B and C
will respectively analyze the evolution of the term complicity and its
various current usages as well as complicity in the ICL context.
Section D will assess whether ICL is a suitable framework for MNC
accountability. Finally, section E will analyze the extent to which ICL-
related crimes can be regulated by alternative means.
A. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW & MNCS
In addition to the norms of international law discussed in Part I,
ICL equally provides direct obligations for MNCs. While a
recognizable body of ICL does exist, the precise parameters of this
body of law are often unclear. ICL often distinguishes between two
categories of offenses under international law: violations of jus
cogens,457 which are considered offenses against the international
community by virtue of their sheer gravity; and transnational or
international crimes, which affect at least two states and are
criminalized under international conventions.
Some authors argue that respect for jus cogens norms directly
binds MNCs.45s Although the group ofjus cogens prohibitions is not
fixed, at a minimum it includes prohibitions on genocide, crimes
against humanity, slavery, piracy, torture, and apartheid. 45 9 According
to the ICJ, these "peremptory norms of international law" derive from
"the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human
457 "A mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law
accepted and recognized by the international community as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 937 (9th ed. 2009).
458 Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi, Liability of Multinational
Corporations Under International Law, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 8-9 (Menno T. Kamminga &
Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
459 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes, in INT'L CRIMINAL LAW VOL. 1 41
(Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2d ed. 1999); ICJ Report, supra note 2, vol. 2,
at 4.
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,460,,461
person' 60 or from "elementary considerations of humanity. Under
this view, jus cogens norms share the same cornerstones as human
rights law. Although no text explicitly imposes such prohibitions on
MNCs, recent U.S. judicial decisions have held that non-state actors
such as MNCs, like states, are obligated not to violate these norms and
face liability if they do.462 While individual officers of MNCs may be
prosecuted before the International Criminal Court (ICC), at present,
463MNCs may not. Instead, MNCs that breach these norms may face
liability in any state under the principle of universal jurisdiction.4 4
Indeed, considering the lacuna in the ICC's jurisdiction as compared to
the number of countries that have enacted domestic legislation pursuant
to international human rights obligations, such as the statute of the
ICC465 and the conventions against genocide and torture,466 corporate
460 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain)
(Second Phase), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
461 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom and Northern Ireland v. Albania)
1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
462 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-43 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that
genocide and war crimes werejus cogens norms which could not be derogated
by states or private individuals); Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 932 (9th Cir.
2002) (finding Unocal could be liable for "aiding and abetting" the Myanmar
military in committing violations of international law, where forced labor was
the modern day equivalent of slavery and, therefore, a violation of ajus cogens
norm).
463 France's proposal to give the ICC jurisdiction over both natural and
legal persons was rejected. See generally Larissa van den Herik, Subjecting
Corporations to the ICC Regime: Analyzing the Legal Counterarguments, J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. (forthcoming). Nevertheless, the possibility of a review of the
Int'l Criminal Ct. Statute after July 1, 2009 provides an opportunity for states to
reconsider this option. U.N. Diplomatic Conf. on Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an Int'l Crim. Ct., Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, art.121, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, (July 17, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998)
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
464 Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity from Nuremberg to Rangoon:
an Examination of Forced Labor Cases and their Impact on the Liability of
Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91, 154 (2002).
465 FAFO Report, supra note 4, at 15; Coalition for the Intn'l Crim. Ct.,
Chart on the Status of Ratification and Implementation of the Rome Statute and
the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities (APIC),
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/Global_Ratificationimplementati
on_chartApr20l0 %283%29.pdf (last visited June 4, 2010).
466 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (discussing
genocide); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
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liability for grave violations remains primarily a matter for domestic
criminal law prosecution.4 6 7 The domestic legislation usually does not
distinguish between natural and legal persons,4 68 thus making the
prohibitions in questions equally applicable to MNCs.
International law also provides for the criminalization of
transnational or international offenses, which indirectly affect MNCs.
International law increasingly classifies certain acts as international
crimes and requires criminal prosecution at the domestic level. 469 An
estimated 17 multilateral instruments exist at the international and
European level with provisions concerning corporate criminal liability
for a variety of specific international offenses. 470  Such instruments
criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials,4 7 1 the financing of
terrorism,4 72 transnational organized crime,4 7 3 and corruption.4 7 4 Each
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23
I.L.M. 1027 (discussing torture).
467 See FAFO Report, supra note 4.
468 Id. at 16, 27.
469 Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights
Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 304, 316-17,
325.
470 See Swart, supra note 450, at 949.
471 OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in Int'l Bus. Transactions, art.2, OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, Nov. 21,
1997 (providing "[e]ach party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in
accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons");
Id. art. 3.2 (providing for substitute sanctions in jurisdictions where criminal
responsibility is not applicable to legal persons (that is, corporations)).
472 U.N. Int'l Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/109, art. 5(3), U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999)
(mandating "effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal, civil or
administrative sanctions") [hereinafter Financing Terrorism Convention].
473 U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo
Convention), G.A. Res. 55/25, art. 10(l), U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8,
2001) (specifying "[e]ach State Party shall adopt such measures as may be
necessary, consistent with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal
persons for participation in serious crimes involving an organized criminal
group") [hereinafter Palermo Convention]. The Convention also provides that
states must impose "effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-
criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions." Id. art. 10(4)
474 U.N. Convention Against Corruption, GA Res. 58/4, art. 26(l)-(2),
U.N. Doc. AIRES/58/4 (Nov. 21, 2003) (providing "I. Each State Party shall
adopt such measures as may be necessary, consistent with its legal principles,
to establish the liability of legal persons for participation in the offenses
established in accordance with this Convention. 2 .... the liability of legal
persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.").
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convention requires state parties to adopt measures to hold corporations
criminally liable and to impose either criminal sanctions or, in the event
criminal liability does not exist under domestic law, non-criminal
sanctions (namely civil or administrative liability) on "legal
persons. ' ' 7S The conventions equally provide for secondary liability
for MNCs that aid and abet violators.476 A state's failure to exercise
jurisdiction over companies who violate such conventions can entail
state responsibility.
477
At the European level, the Council of Europe (COE) 478 and the
European Union (EU) 479 have introduced similar conventions
outlawing certain activities and requiring domestic criminalization
which often extends to MNCs.48 ° Other framework decisions of the
EU,48 1 whose criminalization provisions extend to MNCs, include the
1998 COE Convention on the Protection of Environment through
Criminal Law482 and the 2007 COE Convention on the Protection of
475 Cassel, supra note 469, at 316.
476 Financing Terrorism Convention, supra note 472, art. 5(a) (accomplice
liability), 5(c) (intentionally contributing to commission of crime by a group
with a common purpose); Palermo Convention, supra note 471, art. 5(l)(b)
(aiding or abetting).
477 Alston et al., supra note 13, at 559.
478 Criminal Convention on Corruption art. 18, Jan. 27, 1999, 1999 Europ.
T.S. No. 173 ("Each party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as
may be necessary to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for the criminal
offenses of active bribery, trading in influence and money laundering.").
479 See Joint Action on Corruption in the Private Sector, 1998 O.J. (L 358)
2-4; Convention on the Fight against Corruption Involving Officials of the
European Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union
of June 25, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 195) 2-11; Convention on the Protection of the
European Communities' Financial Interests of July 26, 1995, 1995 O.J. (C 316)
49-57 (aiming to make fraud against the European Community a crime under
community law); see also the Second Council Protocol of June 19, 1997 to the
Convention on the Protection of the European Communities' Financial
Interests, art.3, 1997 O.J. (C 221) (imposing liability on legal persons).
480 See Sara Beale & Adam Safwat, What Developments in Western
Europe Tell Us about American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8
BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 89, 126-36 (2005).
481 Framework decisions align the laws and regulations of the EU's
Member States. Europa: Gateway to the European Union, Glossary, Decision
and framework decision, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/framework_
decisions en.htm (last visited June 4, 2010).
482 Convention on the Protection of Environment, supra note 226.
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Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse.483  The
European instruments dictate that, irrespective of whether states
independently accept the concept of corporate criminal liability at the
domestic level, they must subject serious MNC misconduct to
repressive sanctions that are "effective, proportionate and dissuasive"
in the words of the European Court of Justice and the European Court
of Human Rights.
484
B. EVOLUTION OF THE TERM 'COMPLICITY' AND ITS CURRENT
LINK TO ICL
Before assessing any advantages that ICL, including particularly
its concept of complicity, offers in terms of MNC accountability, a
close examination of complicity is necessary. In the words of Amnesty
International, "the concept of complicity is nuanced and multilayered,
with different meanings in different contexts, 485 As recognized by the
ICJ Expert Panel, the notion of complicity did not originally denote any
connection with criminal law.486  Generally, human rights
organizations, policy makers, and government experts used the term in
laymen's speech merely to convey an MNC's (shameful) implication in
"acts that are negative and unacceptable. ' '487  This etymology is
confirmed by its use by the NGO, Human Rights Watch (HRW).
According to HRW, its use of the word complicity to describe the
actions of the Shell corporation in Nigeria and Enron in India was not
intended, nor was it a part of the organization's goal, to argue that the
MNCs were criminally liable for their actions and thus subject to
prosecution.488 In fact, HRW consciously went so far as to eschew the
use of "accomplice" and "aiding and abetting" for fear of connoting
criminal liability. As a human rights organization, HRW simply used
the term complicity to convey that the MNCs were implicated in human
rights abuses by states that hosted the MNCs and that bore human
483Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation
and Sexual Abuse, Oct. 25, 2007, 2007 Europ. T.S. No. 201.
484 Swart, supra note 450, at 953.
485 Irene Khan, Secretary-General, Amnesty Int'l, Understanding
Corporate Complicity: Extending the Notion Beyond Existing Laws, Speech at
the Business Human Rights Seminar (Dec. 8, 2005),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL34/001/2006/en/4c856377-fa0a-
11 dd-b lbO-c961 f7df9c35/po1340012006en.html.4861CJ Report, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 1-2.
487 Id.
488 See Ken Roth, Is Corporate Liability a Form of Complicity? What is
Really a Corporate Entity?, 6 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 947, 947-79, 959 (2008).
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rights obligations. 489 By using complicity, HRW hoped to do no more
than appeal to the public's sense of morality in order to shame the
MNCs. 49 0 However, with time "business complicity" and "corporate
complicity" became used more generally to denote undesirable
business involvement in predominantly human rights abuses.
49
'
However, complicity 492 has a criminal law meaning which is
closely linked to the concept of "aiding and abetting.493 Aiding and
abetting places (secondary) responsibility for commission of a
criminalized act on an actor having a lesser involvement in the
commission of the act itself.494 Since almost all legal systems in the
world have in their criminal codes495 provisions concerning complicity,
aiding and abetting, or both,496 the term is naturally a concept of
criminal law. When international criminal law was born after World
War II, the concept of aiding and abetting was naturally also
introduced.497
Under ICL and other criminal law systems, the notion of
complicity, or accomplice liability, is a broad category of secondary
liability which encompasses several modes of participation such as
instigating, ordering, planning, or conspiring to commit a crime and
extends to superior responsibility where a superior fails to prevent or
punish the commission of a crime. 498 Although each of these modes of
complicity may be charged as independent crimes, generally speaking,
in the view of the International Law Commission (ILC) all of these




491 ICJ Report, supra note 2, vol. 2.
492 Defined as "association or participation in a criminal act; the act or
state of being an accomplice." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 324 (9th ed. 2009).
493 ICJ Report, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 2.
494 To aid and abet is "[t]o assist or facilitate the commission of a crime, or
to promote its accomplishment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 81 (9th ed. 2009).
495 FAFO Report, supra note 4, at 17-22.
496 John G. Ruggie, U.N. SRSG for Business & Hum. Rts., Remarks at
Business & Human Rights Seminar, Old Billingsgate, London, Dec. 8, 2005, at
2. "Aiding and abetting is a crime in most jurisdictions." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 81 (9th ed. 2009).
497 Robert Cryer, H~kan Friman, Darryl Robinson, & Elizabeth
Wilmshurst, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 310 (2007).4 9 81 d. at 312-30.
499 See IC, Report, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 2; U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [ 1996] 2 Y.B. Int'l
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To illustrate how the terms complicity and aiding and abetting
have been used interchangeably over the years, it suffices to compare
Principle VII of the 1950 Nuremberg Principles, which affirmed that
"[c]omplicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime,
or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under
international law," 500 with the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes 501 and
the 1998 Rome Statute for the ICC, 50 2 which criminalize aiding and
abetting in, inter alia, the same core crimes (and genocide).
To add to this confusion, in addition to its colloquial and criminal
law usages, complicity is a commonly used term under America's
infamous ATCA although this act provides for civil, not criminal,
liability.0 3 Most recently, ATCA has supported a spate of cases
alleging MNC complicity in human rights violations. 5° 4 In contrast to
the ICL concept of complicity however, ATCA finds civil liability,
akin to torts, for violations of the law of nations. 505
Significantly, the ICJ Report recognizes the confusion over the
term complicity and draws an express distinction between its colloquial
and criminal law connotations. Thus, in Volume 2 of the report, the
ICJ expressly discusses the various concepts of liability under ICL and,
inter alia, aiding and abetting, whilst in Volume 3, it discusses the
broader notion of complicity-meaning undesirable involvement in
L. Comm'n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CA.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l. (Part. 2) [hereinafter
ILC Draft Code of Crimes]. Pursuant to Chapter 2, Article 2(3)(d), an
individual who "knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and
substantially, in the commission of such a crime, including providing the means
for its commission" is criminally responsible.
500 Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 377, UN Doc. A/CN. 4/SER.A/1950/Add. 1.
501 ILC Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 499.
502 Rome Statute, supra note 463. Article 25, § 3(c) provides that a person
may be held criminally liable and subject to punishment for assisting or
attempting to assist in the commission of a crime. Id.
503 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (providing "[tihe
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.").
'04 For a review of major ATCA litigation cases, see Cassel, supra note
469, at 305-06.
505 For an overview, see Tarek F. Maassarani, Four Counts of Corporate
Complicity: Alternative Forms of Accomplice Liability Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 38 INT'L L. & POL. 39, 39-65 (2006); ICJReport, supra note 2, vol.
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another's act-against the existing framework of civil liability at the
domestic level.5 °6 In light of the differing usages of this term, it is
evidently erroneous to automatically assume that all references to
corporate complicity necessarily entail criminal liability. To the
contrary, as will be shown, ICL has a relatively restricted scope, which
cannot remedy the full range of traditional MNC violations.
C. ICL-RELATED COMPLICITY
Under ICL, complicity is most commonly linked to crimes
against humanity, war crimes, genocide, 50 7 and aggression (known as
the core crimes). The war crimes trials, which occurred post-WWII,
illustrated that complicity in Nazi activities extended to non-state
actors, such as prominent industrialists.5 0 8 Cases brought against the
individual leaders of companies alleged complicity in genocide 50 9 and
aggression.
5 10
506 ICJReport, supra note 2, vol. 3, at 1.
507 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide art. 3, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess. 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
508 See United States v. Krupp, in 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10
1 (1950) (charging the Krupp firm and twelve of its officials for participation in
corporate use of slave labor and other crimes of war); United States v. Flick, in
6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 1 (1952) (charging steel industrialist
Friedrich Flick and five associates with use of slave labor and other war
crimes); United States v. Krauch, in 7-8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10
1 (1953) (charging all directors of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. who knowingly
complied with corporate policy with unlawful employment of slave labor and
other crimes of war); In re Tesch (Zyklon B case) 13 Ann. Dig. 250 (Brit. Mil.
Ct. 1946), reprinted in 1 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS 93, 93 (1947) [hereinafter L.R.T.W.C.].
509 See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and
Sentence, (Dec. 3, 2003) (charging Nahimana for, among other things,
complicity in Genocide for broadcasting messages on national radio which
incited ethnic hatred and murders of the Tutsi people).
510 Krauch, supra note 508; Krupp, supra note 508. The defendants were
not ultimately convicted because they lacked the necessary knowledge. See
Kevin J. Heller, Retreat from Nuremberg: the Leadership Requirement in the
Crime ofAggression, 18 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 477, 477-97 (2007).
SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 6.2
2010] CORPORATE MISBEHAVIOR & INTERNATIONAL LAW: 243
ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES TO "COMPLICITY"?
In addition to its role in ICL, several other international law
instruments provide for complicity, namely for the international crimes
of torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment;511 people
trafficking for the purpose of prostitution; 51 2  and enforced
disappearance. t 3
Complicity in ICL accordingly applies to an altogether different
league of violations than those discussed in Part I, not to mention that
the relevant crimes under ICL are rarely governable by the alternative
accountability mechanisms discussed in Part I. Although no
international forum is currently capable of holding MNCs accountable
for violations of core crimes, due in part to the ICC's lack of
jurisdiction over legal persons, the increasing number of domestic
jurisdictions enacting implementing legislation pursuant to
international conventions and recognizing criminal liability of
corporations for ICL crimes ensures that MNC immunity is a dying
phenomenon.
51 4
Notwithstanding the possible expansion of ICC jurisdiction to
encompass legal persons, because the scope of ICL is constricted to a
very well defined range of activities, ICL does not dominate the
discussion about suitable mechanisms for regulating all MNC
misconduct. However, this is not to say that ICL is not conceptually
well suited to regulating MNC accountability. The next section
illustrates why this field of international law, when compared to others,
is conceptually well suited to regulating MNCs.
511 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 4, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 100-20 (1988).
512 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others art. 17, Dec. 2, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S.
271. 513 Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance art. 6, G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 (Dec. 20,
2006).
514 ICI Report, supra note 2, at 5; FAFO Report, supra note 4, at 15-16.
Although evidentiary and procedural obstacles, for example, corporations law
concerning the lifting of the corporate veil and the plea of forum non
conveniens, render it difficult to obtain effective legal redress even at the
domestic level. Id.
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D. IS ICL A SUITABLE FRAME WORK FOR MNC
ACCOUNTABILITY?
Seeing that the core crimes under ICL derive from "elementary
considerations of humanity '515 and commission of the underlying acts
"shock[s] the conscience of mankind,"5 6 their criminalization is not
surprising. The heinous quality of such crimes, coupled with their large
scale character, provides the added element of gravity warranting
criminalization. In comparison, less heinous violations of international
law, i.e. violations of environmental and labor laws and human rights
violations of lesser severity, have not been criminalized. Instead, each
field provides for alternative accountability mechanisms, as studied in
Part I.
What then accounts for the increasing trend for various
international instruments, some not directly or uniquely concerning
protection of human dignity, not only to prohibit but even favor
criminalization of other MNC behaviors such as corruption,
environmental abuse, and the financing of terrorism? 51 7 Do the drafters
of these documents regard these acts as more severe and offensive to
society than other violations? Or does this move towards corporate
criminal liability evidence a view that domestic criminal law as best
suited to deal with MNC misconduct? And why then do international
human rights and labor law instruments not follow this trend of
criminalization?
In considering whether ICL is an appropriate accountability
means for NC misconduct, it is necessary to consider first whether
MNCs are proper subjects of criminal liability under ICL and second
whether the traditional ICL structures can apply mutatis mutandis to
situations in which the accused is an MNC. Without delving into the
academic debates as to whether MNCs can or should be subject to
criminal liability in general, 51 8 numerous domestic jurisdictions, not
515 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom and Northern Ireland v. Albania)
1949 I.C.J. 4,22 (Apr. 9).
516 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the
Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 57 (Oct. 2,
1995).
517 See supra notes 472-74, 482.
518 Ronald C. Slye, Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal
Liability, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 955, 955-73 (2008). In sum, the principle
arguments against the application of criminal liability to MNCs are several.
First, while criminal law's evident goal is to punish wrongdoers, its traditional
punishments are not easily translated to MNCs since an entity cannot be
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only recently but for decades, have accepted criminal liability of
corporations. 51 9 By contrast, criminal liability at the international level
is somewhat less settled, 520 even if there is arguably no significant
impediment to treating MNCs as subjects of international law. 521
Indeed, if MNCs are capable of holding rights under certain
international instruments, 522 there is no reason why they should not
incur the countervailing liabilities.523 In fact, considering their direct
liability for environmental damage, it would be surprising that MNCs
should altogether escape liability for mass atrocities.524
Turning to the second issue, compared to other fields of
international law discussed in Part I (with the limited exception of
environmental law) the structure of criminal law offers an advantage
vis-A-vis MNC liability because it is not state-centric.525 As the oft-
cited Nuremberg authority infamously posits, "crimes . . . are
committed by men, not abstract entities. 526 Using this rationale, the
court pierced the veil of the state and held individual state leaders
responsible for the atrocities committed during World War II (WWII).
imprisoned. To counter this argument, fines and deregistration have been
developed as punishments although their adequacy is debatable. Second, it is
argued that criminal law's deterrent effect is underpinned by shame and
remorse, neither of which an MNC is capable of feeling, with the end-goal
being incapacitation. When one considers the harmful effects of bad publicity
on MNCs and its flow-on effects to their activities, then this objection can be
disposed of. Third, and most importantly perhaps, as recognized at Nuremberg,
how can MNCs as "fictitious beings, with no physical presence and no
individual consciousness" have the necessary mens rea to be criminally
responsible? Domestic jurisdictions have elaborated several means to address
these evidentiary issues, either by attribution of a single employee's acts to the
MNC, imposing liability for the acts of senior management where the aggregate
of information establishes mens rea, or by analyzing an MNC's 'corporate
culture' to assess whether its internal procedures were negligent. Id. See also
V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of
Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 355 (1999).519 FAFO Report, supra note 4.
520 Slye, supra note 518.
521 Id.
522 E.g., Campbell, supra note 99; NAFTA, supra note 129. See also
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain) (Second
Phase), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33 (Feb. 5).
523 See Slye, supra note 518, at 959.
524 Id.
525 See van den Herik, Corporate Policy, supra note 334, at 7.
526 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg): Judgment and Sentences,
reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 221 (1947).
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Since then, and in contrast to international human rights or labor law,
ICL has always placed respect for its obligations firmly on the
shoulders of the individual, not the state.
Paradoxically then, how can ICL provide a suitable framework
for direct MNC accountability? Is it not ironic that while Nuremberg
advocated the breaking of the collective in favor of the individual,
insofar as criminal responsibility is concerned, modern trends suggest
reversing in favor of the collective, this time the MNC? 527 The short
answer is no. To suggest that MNCs can be criminally responsible is
not to suggest a move away from individual responsibility, but rather a
widening of the reach of responsibility such as to include the existence
of liability for legal persons, i.e. MvNCs, in parallel to physical persons.
Recognizing MNC liability under ICL is not antithetical to the
individualized and non-state-centric character of ICL considering that
MNCs have legal personality. 528 Due to this individual personality,
MNCs are no more than an individual of a different character, namely a
legal person. ICL is therefore open to embracing MNCs as a subject
that can be liable for wrongful acts, just as individuals can. For that
reason, ICL, contrary to other fields of law which will be discussed
below, is not adverse to the concept of MNC accountability.
In comparison, direct criminalization of MNCs for human rights
violations is non-existent, so it suffices to analyze the foundations of
human rights law to understand why. Human rights law developed
predominantly after WWII because of the perceived need to
counterbalance the potential horrors of state power-specifically, to
protect individuals from incursions by the state into their private
lives.529 For that reason, instruments enshrining human rights were
developed providing citizens with legal claims against states, and
states, then viewed as the only bearers of international law obligations,
were tasked with the fulfillment and protection of their citizens' human
rights.530  States today are still expected to prevent human rights
violations as well provide effective ex post facto measures to address
violations when they occur.
31
527 Slye, supra note 518.
528 See Karsten Nowrot, New Approaches to the International Legal
Personality of Multinational Corporations: Towards a Rebuttable Presumption
of Normative Responsibilities, 79 PHIL.L. J. 563 (2004) (reviewing MNCs and
international legal personality).
529 Christopher J. M. Safferling, Can Prosecution be the Answer to Human
Rights Violations?, 5(12) GERMAN L.J. 1469, 1471 (2004).
530 Id.
531 See, e.g., the ICCPR supra note 22, arts. 2(2) & 2(3)(a).
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On the other hand, because in the modem era MNCs can
influence individuals (potentially detrimentally) as much as states can,
there has been a move towards recognizing the need to protect human
rights from abuses from this new entity and to subject the growing
power of MNCs to human rights obligations.532 Despite this trend, as
Part I.A.l.a demonstrates, states formally remain the sole guardian of
human rights, even if human rights courts attempt to erode the
traditional divide by increasingly interpreting states' public law duties
as embracing the private law realm.533
The primary challenge faced in placing human rights obligations
directly on MNCs is delineating the extent of such obligations and
strictly codifying what is expected of MNCs.534 MNCs, unlike states,
cannot be expected to guarantee the full spectrum of traditionally state-
sponsored human rights obligations, to illustrate, the right to education,
for the simple reason that they do not enjoy full territorial or public
powers. 535 Instead the extent of an MNC's obligations should depend
on the extent of power it exercises.536 The extent to which MNCs can
be responsible for certain human rights obligations, if any, is certainly a
much-contested debate, and the outcome may likely be fact specific,
depending principally on the size and activities of the MNC in
question.537  Despite the clear trend towards developing MNC
responsibility in this field and the numerous attempts to date to codify
human rights obligations, given the resistance of the business
community to such codifications, there will not likely be an answer to
this debate any time soon.
538
Turning to labor law obligations, contrary to common
expectations, such obligations are not placed on the shoulders of MNCs
despite their direct relationship as employers. Since the 19th century,
international labor law developed as a means of social justice in
response to the need to protect workers from the heavy burdens of
industrialization. Industrialization resulted from international
532 ICHRP supra note 12, at 1-2.
533 Sarala Fitzgerald, Corporate Accountability for Human Rights
Violations in Australian Domestic Law, 11(1) AusTL. J. HUM. RTs. 2 (2005),
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/joumals/AJHR/2005/2.html.
534 See van den Herik, Corporate Policy, supra note 334, at 8.
535 Id. at 4-5.
536 Id. at 5.
537 Id.
538 Id.at 4-5.
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competition between employers and between countries 539 and from
inequalities in bargaining power between employers and employees.
5 40
Since the state that protects labor rights is disadvantaged in profitability
compared to the state that places a higher value on economic self-
interest, the traditional means of ensuring internationalized minimum
standards for employees has been for states to enter into binding
international agreements to impose top-down minimum labor
standards, thereby thwarting a "race to the bottom" in labor
standards. 54' Thus, the protection of workers' rights, like human rights,
has traditionally, and still today, fallen to states. In that vein, many
labor law rights are encompassed within human rights instruments.
542
Consequently, notwithstanding the strong movement toward MNC
accountability for human and labor rights violations, MNC
accountability struggles to find its place in primarily state-centric
fields. For the moment, MNC misconduct in these fields remains
primarily tied to the responsibility of the MNC's home state.
Therefore, there is a need for a conceptual shift before these fields are
fully able to embrace the concept of MNC accountability.
In comparison to human rights law, and as noted in Part I.A.3.b.,
environmental law is receptive to the concept of MNC accountability.
The "Polluter Pays Principle" (PPP) is an internationally accepted
cornerstone of environmental law, 543 which requires "operators" or
"owners" responsible for pollution to pay for it. The PPP embraces
civil liability, the rationale being that while the state could legislate to
preserve the environment, civil liability is a necessary complement that
acts as a disincentive for operators or owners to fail to comply with
environmental law. 544 Therefore, it is clear that unlike the field of
human rights law, there is no conceptual difficulty in accepting MNC
accountability under environmental law since it is accepted as a vital
aspect of environmental regulation. Moreover, unlike in the field of
human rights law, in which the division between MNC and state
539 ILO, Bureau for Workers' Activities, International Labour Law,
Purpose of International Labour Law,
http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-
english/teleam/global/ilo/law/lablaw.htm#Competition (last visited June 6,
2010).
540 Langille, supra note 133, at 8.
41 Id. at 12-13.
542 See ICHRP, supra note 12, 28-34.
543 Rio Declaration, supra note 68, Principle 16.
544 See LAL KURUKULASURIYA & NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON, TRAINING
MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 51-59 (UNEP 2006).
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responsibility is yet to be ironed out, environmental law provides for
the existence of MNC liability in parallel to state responsibility.
545
Therefore, two fields of international law, criminal and
environmental law, have the necessary foundations to embrace the
concept of direct MNC liability in their respective spheres of
application. This is not to say that either field of law lends itself to
providing an overall structure for MNC accountability, nor that one or
the other is necessarily better suited for founding such accountability.
This is clear in light of the obvious substantive limitations of each field,
i.e., direct liability provided for under environmental law regulates a
very thin slice of MNC conduct, as does the branch of ICL. While the
range of individual acts encompassed by each core crime are crimes in
their own right at the domestic level, 546 at the international level, the
individual acts only qualify as a core crime when their unique and
specific contextual elements are established. For example, multiple
murders will only be classified as crimes against humanity if they were
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack. Similarly,
murder may only classify as a war crime if it was committed in a
context of armed conflict. Again, the same act of murder may only
classify as genocide if it was executed with the intent to destroy, in part
or in whole, specific human groups. For that reason, MNCs accused of
individual murders or disappearances will not be convicted for one of
ICL's core crimes unless the necessary contextual elements are made
out. Thus, in the absence of such contextual elements, responsibility
can accrue at best under the relevant domestic criminal law and then
only with respect to the specific act in question.
The foregoing illustrates that, notwithstanding the comparative
conceptual ease by which ICL could accept MNCs as subjects, ICL is
not substantively sufficient to unilaterally regulate all MNC
misconduct. To the extent that ICL is a self-contained field regulating
only a limited number of core international crimes, it cannot provide a
means of redress for all international law violations, for example, of
human rights or labor law.
545 Id.
546 For example, crimes against humanity encompasses the acts of murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer, imprisonment,
torture, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced
sterilization or any other form of sexual violence, enforced disappearances and
arbitrary detention and apartheid.
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E. DO OTHER ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ADDRESS "ICL-
BEHAVIOR "?
Human rights law does not suffer the same shortcomings as ICL
in connection with MNC accountability. Compared to the confined
scope and rigid nature of ICL, which is underpinned by the maxim
nullum crimen sine lege requiring strict interpretation of its norms,547
human rights law, despite its conceptual shortcomings in connection
with MNC accountability, provides a much broader accountability
framework by which to adjudicate MNC violations. In recognition of
the object and purpose of human rights law to protect the individual,
human rights courts are traditionally willing to give an expansive
interpretation to the substance of certain human rights. This is clear
when one considers pioneering human rights jurisprudence that views
environmental and labor law 548 breaches as human rights violations.
In the same spirit, certain criminal acts can constitute human
rights violations insofar as the relevant state has failed to prevent
offenses against or fulfill its obligations toward citizens. For example,
enforced disappearances549 and extrajudicial killings550 have been found
to violate the right to life,551 the right to personal integrity, 552 and the
right to personal liberty.553 Although both examples concerned
criminal acts committed by government actors, noting that the human
rights courts have not shied away from adjudicating other human rights
547 Beth van Shaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the
Intersection of Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119, 122-23.
548 E.g., Wilson v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 30668/96, 30671/96, and
30678/96, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 523 (2002) (the ECHR found that the applicants'
rights of freedom to association were violated by legislation which allowed
employers to offer pay raises to workers who agreed to accept employee
contracts not negotiated by trade unions); Siliadin v France, App. No.
73316/01, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 545 (2005) (highlighting the obligation of
States to protect individuals, here a domestic migrant worker, from an unfair
outcome in the employment relation). See Virginia Mantouvalou, Servitude
and Forced Labour in the 21st Century: The Human Rights of Domestic
Workers, 35 INDUS. L. J. 395 (2006).
549 Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 4
(July 29, 1988).
550 Barrios Altos v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 87 (Mar.
14, 2001).
551 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 110, art. 4.
552 Id. art. 5.
553 Id. art. 7.
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issues in the private business sector, 554 there is no reason why they
should hesitate in the case of graver abuses committed by MNCs.
Therefore, to the extent that a direct case against an MNC cannot be
brought under ICL (for lack of the necessary contextual elements
perhaps), human rights courts may well have jurisdiction.
The weakness in relying upon human rights courts as an
accountability mechanism, however, lies in the fact that MNC liability
can only be invoked indirectly through state responsibility. Yet, before
state responsibility can successfully be invoked, it is necessary to show
knowledge and neglect on the part of the state for failing to prevent or
subsequently failing to punish the disobedient MNC. Moreover, in
contrast to the ICL context, since the jurisdiction of human rights
bodies under existing human rights mechanisms is limited to states, any
responsibility will be that of the state, rather than the NINC.
F. CONCLUSIONS ON ICL COMPLICITY AND MNC
ACCOUNTABILITY
While in theory nothing precludes MNCs from being solely and
primarily responsible for international law violations, the ICJ Expert
Panel focused on complicity predominantly because most complaints
against MNCs allege that they are implicated with another actor
(usually the state) in the perpetration of human rights abuses.555 As
noted, the ICJ Report nevertheless drew a distinction between ICL
complicity discussed in Volume 2 of its Report and complicity in tort
and civil actions considered in Volume 3. This two-layered approach
not only illustrates the complexity of the MNC accountability debate
but also that ICL is not viewed as the sole means by which MNC
misconduct can be reined in. The ICJ presumably recognizes that one
framework, such as ICL, is insufficient to deal with the variety of forms
that MNC violations assume, hence its broad interpretation of
complicity and study of the topic under both international and domestic
law.
Regardless, neither variation of complicity provides the only
accountability mechanism for MNC misconduct. Insofar as
international law mechanisms are concerned, the fact that a significant
section of academic work concentrates on ICL-complicity as the core
554 Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom., App. No. 13134/87, 427 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 27 (1993); Awas Tingni Indigenuous Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001).
555 ICJ Report, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 1.
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mechanism for ensuring MNC accountability does not suggest that it is
the sole means, as Part I illustrates. As shown, the focus of core ICL
crimes is extremely limited and does not encompass complicity for
other international law violations in the absence of a specific
international convention. Accordingly, most violations fall outside the
scope of ICL and are determined by the assortment of independent
mechanisms discussed in Part I, if not solely under domestic law in the
first place. The likely explanation for the Panel's predominant focus on
ICL rests simply with the need to begin regulating the most serious and
egregious of international abuses committed by MNCs, but this policy
choice does not otherwise preclude the existence of parallel
mechanisms to deal with entirely separate categories of international
violations.
What then is the way forward? Is it better to allow for a
multiplicity of international law mechanisms to deal with various
violations, or should there be a move towards the development of an
international convention on corporate criminal liability? Although the
latter is preferable, the response of the business sector to the arguably
overly ambitious UN Norms is a powerful reminder that states and
governments are not yet ready to take such grandiose steps. For the
foreseeable future, the development of international instruments
binding on MNCs remains a utopian idea, and the issue of direct
accountability will primarily continue to be regulated at the domestic
level. Nevertheless, although significant work lies ahead, such as
convincing MNCs of the value of respecting international law
obligations; convincing states of the value of ensuring compliance of
their MNCs with international law obligations, both at home and
abroad; and strengthening domestic mechanisms and creating
international law mechanisms which target MNCs, the trend towards
MNC accountability has nevertheless gathered momentum in recent
decades and the issue has gained a firm foothold as a matter of concern
on the international agenda. As such, it is only a matter of time until
the status of MNCs on the international stage evolves from object of
international law to subject, with all the rights and liabilities that this
entails.
556
556 BIN CHENG, INTRODUCTION TO SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 23 (Mohammed
Bedjaoui ed., UNESCO 1991).
